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Abstract 
One of Africa’s longest civil wars ended for the second time in 2005, when the leaders 
of the government of Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army signed the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This action initiated an interim period which culminated 
with a referendum for the people of Southern Sudan, to decide if they wanted unity or to 
secede from the north. Through using theories of power sharing and secession this thesis 
argues that the Sudanese conflict is not resolved after the referendum in South Sudan. The 
focus of this thesis is to illustrate how the first peace agreement in 1972 failed to deal with 
root causes and to implement structures that would be acceptable for that part of the 
population which did not identify with the central elite. Lessons from this process are integral 
to understand why the secession does not provide the autonomy and prospects of peace that 
the South and the negotiators intended. This study will provide a thorough assessment of the 
process from the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 to the making of- and 
contents of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Although there are many positive 
aspects to the recent agreement, this study will reveal how the North will keep asserting its 
dominance through controlling the oil sector and using the unresolved border areas for 
political gain. In addition, the new structure has changed power structures in both areas, 
which has left many opposing groups in Sudan in a worse situation than before; thus, the 
further marginalized people in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile are the real 
losers in the post-CPA era. As often portrayed, the peace in South Sudan does not only 
depend on development, but on external influence from the region and especially their 
relationship with the regime in Khartoum, despite the construction of an autonomous state. 
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Opsomming 
Een van Afrika se langsdurendeburgeroorloë het vir die tweedekeergeëindig in 2005, 
toe die regering van Soedan en die SoedaneseBurgelikkeVryheidsbewegingen Weermag die 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) onderteken het. Hierdieooreenkoms was die begin 
van 'n interim-tydperkwatuitgeloophet op ‘n referendum vir die bevolking van Suid-Soedan, 
waarinhullemoesbesluit of hullewouafstig van die noorde. Deurgebruiktemaak van 
teorieëopmagsdeling en afstigtinglighierdietesis die meningdat die 
Soedanesekonfliknieopgelosisna die referendum in Suid-Soedannie. Die fokus van 
hierdietesis was op die illustrering van hoe die eerstevredesooreenkoms van 1972 gevaal het 
om die sleuteloorsakevan die konflikteondersoek en omstrukture in plektestelvir die gedeeltes 
van die bevolkingwatnie met die sentrale  elite geïdentifiseerhet nie. Die lesse van hierdie 
proses is integraal in die verstaan van hoekomoutonomie en vooruitsigte van vredeniein die 
Suidekanvoortspruituit die afstigting van Suid-Sudansooswat die bedoeling van die 
onderhandelaars was nie. Hierdiestudiesal ‘n deeglikkeasseseringdoen van die proses tussen 
die Addis Ababa Ooreenkoms van 1972 tot en met die sluit van die Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005, asookop die inhoud van hierdieooreenkoms. Alhoewel die 
nuweooreenkomsbaiepositieweaspektebevat, sal die studietoon hoe die Noorde steeds 
sydominansiesalkanhandhaaf, virpolitieke wins, deurbeheeruitteoefenoor die oliesektor en 
deuronopgelostegrensgeskille. Daarbenewens het die nuwestruktuurveranderdemagstrukture 
in beidegebiedeteweeggebringwatnougelei het tot ‘n 
somsslegtersituasieviroposisiegroepebinne Sudan; dus is die verdergemarginaliseerde Darfur 
streek, die Nubagebergtes en die BlouNyl die waareverloorders van die na-CPA era. 
Soosdikwelsuitgebeeld word, sal die vrede in Suid-Soedannie net afhang van 
ontwikkelingnie, maarook vaneksterneinvloedevanuit die streek en veralvan hulverhouding 
met die Khartoemregime, ten spyte van die konstruksie van 'n outonomestaat. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Historical context to the study 
 Sudan is a country which has a long history of conflict and separation, which can be 
traced all the way back to 2700 BC, when this area was known as the Cush, and was in 
conflict with Egypt and Assyria. Political control over the area was more or less linked to 
Egyptian authority, until the year 750 BC, when the Cushite king Kashta who ruled the area 
as independent and even conquered North Egypt.  By the year 600, the Cushite kingdom was 
pushed further south, close to where Khartoum is today and developed independently of 
Egypt. Religion and ethnicity is important aspects of separation in the area of and around 
Sudan. Islam was highly influential in this period, with impulses and pressure coming from 
Arab merchants and Egyptian forces. In 1093, a Muslim prince with Nubian ethnicity became 
king of Dunqulah. Some ethnicities embraced the Muslim religion and made it an important 
part of their heritage. On the other hand, other areas and ethnicities took influence from the 
Byzantine Empire and attached Christianity to their cultural heritage (Metz 1992:3-17).   
 Modern Sudan has been influenced strongly by the British administration that was 
imposed through the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1899, which functioned as a joint 
authority agreement between Britain and Egypt, to rule over Sudan. This enforced the 
historical separation between the North, where the majority was predominantly Arab and 
Muslim, and the South where the majority were of Christian or other beliefs including most 
traditional beliefs. During the colonization, it was created a physical buffer zone between the 
North and the South, to prevent spread of malaria and other diseases, but also to stop the 
spreading of Arab and Muslim influence to the South. However, Sudan has always been 
treated as one country, and when independence from the British rule became apparent to the 
Sudanese people in 1955, a civil war between the North and South broke out. The South 
wanted independence, whilst the North wanted a unified country lead by the North (Metz 
1992:21-25).  
 To this day, there have been two peace agreements with the option of secession, the 
first one from 1972 to 1983. The second one, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
was officially concluded and signed on 9 January 2005 and culminated in a referendum in 
January 2011, where Southern Sudan opted for secession again. One of the main architects of 
the CPA was Dr. John Garang de Mabior, who founded the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement and Army (SPLM/A), which was a Southern based movement. His objective was 
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not secession, but the creation of a new Sudan founded on the principles of equality, 
secularism and democracy (ICG 2005:5). His philosophy was that Sudan could become one 
united country and that the dichotomy between the North and the South was constructed 
(Deng 2005:6). The people of the North was still of black African descendant in his eyes. 
Garang’s inclusive approaches made many Northerners start to question the Arab identity to 
the point that the governing elite had to counter these doubts with a tougher focus on Islam to 
recreate a common identity and remobilize support. Despite Garang’s visions of a unified 
Sudan, the majority of the Southern Sudanese people opposed this idea, including the 
majority of the SPLM/A. Garang died in 2005 in a helicopter crash, changing the dynamic of 
the post-CPA process. In January 2011, the people of South Sudan voted almost unanimously 
for secession, which are to be implemented in July. This result has been accepted by Omar al-
Bashir, the President of Sudan.  
 
1.2 Aims and significance of the research 
 Recent literature paints a picture of a South Sudan with sundry challenges. Lack of an 
adequate security regime has enabled an escalating level of internal violence; lack of 
appropriate border control along the vast borderlands enabled the Lord’s Resistance Army to 
cross the border from northern Uganda, looting and raping local villagers, killing civilians and 
local police; clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces and Joint Integrated Units in Abyei 
(Rolandsen 2010:1, McEvoy & LeBrun 2010:27, Johnson 2011:1). These tendencies indicates 
that the future of the newly seceded state is based on a weak foundation, there are little 
experience with state building and continuation of it, with the further degenerating factor of 
little revenue from anything else than oil production, which still is very much dominated by 
the North through infrastructure and contestation of oil fields (Global Witness 2009:4-5). The 
indications that emphasize on many levels in society are all happening within a larger context 
and a structural setting. There has been little focus on these structures, which according to the 
argument in this thesis, still prevails after the CPA. 
Professor of International Relations at the United States International University in 
Nairobi, Kenneth Omeje (2010:3) criticized commentators and stakeholders to focus more on 
immediate issues like the schedule of the referendum, if al-Bashir would honor the agreement 
or who gets what. These are all important questions and it is logical for research to focus on 
critical issues when a situation is so uncertain. Therefore, there were no comprehensive study 
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of how the power structures will change after the secession and what parts of the root causes 
and connected issues will still be contentious after the CPA. It’s is important to develop new 
research on post-CPA Sudan, to convey the complexity of the conflict per se and to show how 
the important issues can remain unresolved despite a physical separation and the creating of a 
nationality. Aleksandar Pavković and Peter Radan (2007:3) captures this problem when they 
state that “to regard a secession solely as a liberation from oppression or violence fails to 
capture the complexity of the interaction between the secessionists, their leaders and their 
opponents in the state from which they want to secede”.  
This study aims to provide a thorough understanding of the Sudanese conflict, from 
the root causes to how the dynamic changes with the increasing importance of oil in the 
economy, with a change in attitudes in the international community. Further, the aim is to 
utilize this knowledge in order to assess whether the CPA addressed these important issues 
properly. Through using this descriptive and encompassing approach, combined with a 
theoretical framework of power sharing- and secession theory the conclusive aim will be to 
identify how North- and South Sudan will continue to have an intricate relationship with each 
other after the secession and where the CPA failed in addressing issues that will stand out as 
potential sources of future conflict. 
 
1.3 Identification of the research problem and problem statement 
 In order to address such a broad subject, this section will provide a specification of the 
research problem; the problem statement; and the theoretical framework intended to be 
applied in this thesis. As well as limiting the scope of the study, this section will also deal 
with all that relates to research methods, when it comes to design, reliability and validity, 
structure and challenges to this kind of research.  
 
1.3.1 Problem statement 
 What caused the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement, which set off the violent 
conflict in 1983? This question is essential in order to assess the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in a meaningful manner. Experts on the Sudanese conflict and history have 
contributed a great deal to this topic, reaching various conclusions; whereas Harir (1994:10) 
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emphasize the clash of cultures and interests that creates political marginality which the 
central Arab elite impose on the rest; Rogier (2005:V) argues that power-sharing issues has 
been central in both wars; while (Tvedt 1994:68) describes a structural problem where the 
state, civil society and the international aid agencies failed massively to create any kind of 
sustainable state service. This thesis will use a descriptive analysis of the most important 
works that have been produced when it comes to identify these sources of conflict. Although 
this is not a comparative analysis, the aim is to identify similarities from the first peace 
agreement with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in order to address root causes. It is 
important to emphasize at this point that although the two peace agreements were done 
between the North and the South, the two cannot be compared directly, because of two main 
reasons: a) Different people agreed on the respective agreements; President Nimeiri and the 
Anyanya in 1972; President al-Bashir and the SPLM/A in 2005. b) Different variables had 
different impact on the peace process, one example of this is how oil was an irrelevant issue 
during the first civil war in 1972, but became a contentious issue in 2005. Another example is 
how the international community had a completely different approach to intervening in civil 
conflict in 1972 compared to 2005, where the genocides in Sbrenica and Rwanda set 
precedence for a more interventionist approach.  
 Although much changed between the two peace agreements, that doesn’t mean that 
some of the most important sources of conflict has changed. This thesis will go even further, 
in arguing that despite the South deciding by referendum to secede from the North, the 
conflict has not changed fundamentally. Lesch (1998:3) propose that “Racial, linguistic, and 
religious categories have hardened and become the basis for crucially important power 
relationships that have resulted in the peoples who live in the northern and central Nile Valley 
wielding disproportionate political and economic power”. Thus the motivation for this thesis 
is to analyze the Comprehensive Peace Agreement through a contextual- and a theoretical 
framework based on power sharing and secession.  
 
1.3.2 Research question 
 With regards to the problem statement, the limits to this study will be confined by two 
primary research questions whereas the second have two parts. They both relate to specific 
chapters in the thesis which in turn relates to each other: 
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1. To what extent does secession have the potential to change the power sharing 
relationship between North Sudan and South Sudan? 
2a. Did the Comprehensive Peace Agreement address the sources of conflict? 
2b. What sources of conflict remain unresolved after the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement? 
 
1.3.3 Conceptualization and operationalization of key concepts 
Secession: From Latin, the word translates to ‘se’ which means ‘apart’ and ‘cedere’ which 
means ‘to go’, which gives the connotation of leaving or withdrawing from a place. In the 
English language this word has lost its meaning when it comes to any other meaning than 
“formally withdrawing from an alliance, a federation, a political or religious organization or 
the like” (Pavković & Radan 2007:5). For the use in this thesis, the concept is regarded as a 
process that has a formal constituting act of a referendum and the formal acceptance from the 
leader of the existing state. The concept is operationalized by the definition of Pavković and 
Radan (2007:5): “Secession is the creation of a new state by the withdrawal of a territory and 
its population where that territory was previously part of an existing state”. 
Power sharing relation: The concept of power sharing refers to “a coalition of two or more 
political parties which from the Executive” (Wilford 2003). This infers a division of groups 
with contesting interests that are cooperating in a governmental function. In this thesis, the 
concept refers mainly to the constellation North- and South Sudan, but also internally in the 
respective states. The concept power sharing relation is operationalized in this study as a 
scale that measures a party’s relative proportion of power compared to the counterpart. Power 
sharing relations can in a government be measured by the number of representatives the 
respective party possesses. However, in term of this study, the concept will also be used as in 
informal situations, like the relation between rebel groups in North Sudan in relation to the 
government. In such cases, the concept is measured by an assessment of relative military 
strength and influence in society.  
Conflict: This concept has many connotations. According to the Oxford Dictionaries (2011a) 
conflict means “a serious disagreement or argument, typically a protracted one”, whereas it 
can be used as a mass noun and thereby in this context mean “regional conflicts”. The 
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Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP 2011) defines armed conflict as “a contested 
incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force 
between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths”. In this study these definition will not be sufficient alone; the concept of 
conflict connotes the disagreement, the violent acts but also the structural aspect. Galtung 
(1969) formulates a broader definition of violence in his article ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace 
Research’ where he discusses the concept of peace. Here he states that violence without a 
clear subject-object-relation can be defined as structural violence (Galtung 1969:171). One 
example of this can be a society where life expectancy is significantly higher amongst the 
upper class compared to the lower classes – although no concrete actor is committing direct 
violence, there is a societal structure that deprives one or more groups of certain advances. In 
order to operationalize the concept of conflict in this thesis, the broad connotation will be 
used, encompassing the disagreement, armed conflict as well as structural injustice that occur 
between the involved parts. 
Sources of conflict: With regards to the definition of conflict, the sources of conflict can be 
operationalized as actions, incidents, societal structures or any other cause that lead to 
increase the level of conflict.  
 
1.4 Methodological matters 
 This thesis aspire to cover a tremendously broad subject, with much literature, many 
aspects that is not going to be discussed, some consciously but some because of limited access 
to literature, or even lack of knowledge. By default, social research contains an aspect of 
uncertainty, in qualitative as well as quantitative studies. Therefore, it is important to 
acknowledge the limitations and be conscious of how this will affect the outcome. This 
section is dedicated to reflect on these matters. 
 
1.4.1 Limitations and demarcation of the study 
 One of the greatest limitations of this study is the fact that the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement culminated with the referendum January 2011. The short time span means that 
consequences have yet to unfold that might prove significant to the study. Within the first 
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year of the peace agreement, there had been violent clashes between the North and the South 
in the border areas, as well as continued mediation by the international community. However, 
this limitation is a double edged sword; there is a positive aspect to working with 
contemporary occurrences in the sense that much insight can be gained from media and 
current debates. The limitation of time span does also relate backwards in time, as explained 
introductory. In order to create a concise study, a limited time frame has to be set. Thus this 
study will focus specifically on the CPA from 2005 to 2011. In order to create a context for 
the agreement, the thesis will also use lessons from the Addis Ababa Agreement that lasted 
from 1955 to 1972. Some important occurrences in the period shortly after the signing will 
also be used when relevant for the discussion.   
 Since this study draws its findings from already existing literature, this becomes an 
important aspect to the quality. First, with regards to the sources themselves; where possible 
the sources chosen are literature that is quoted often in academic books, articles and journals, 
this given a relative credibility. However, literature that exists on the subject is also limited 
because of the short time span to the events. The bulk of available literature focuses on topics 
and events that took place between the 1972 agreement and a few years after the signing of 
the CPA in 2005. More recent literature is scarcer, which makes it necessary to use reports 
from organizations and media in addition to cover most aspects. The theoretical framework 
for this thesis draws its literature from a more established foundation. Johan Galtung’s 
definition of structural violence (Galtung 1969:171) and the theoretical framework of 
Complex Political Emergencies by Goohand and Hulme (1999:16), exemplified by Maxwell 
and Burns (2008). Theories of power sharing and secession are also based on a thorough 
foundation of literature. This literature spans from Western perspectives from Northern 
Ireland, Yugoslavia and Belgium in Noel (2005) and O’Flynn & Russel (2005), to the more 
specific approaches of Sisk (1996) that focus on power sharing in international mediation in 
ethnic conflicts. Plenty of literature on consociationalism focuses on Africa and conflict 
situations; Lemarchand (2006) discuss the consociationalist approaches in Rwanda, Burundi 
and the DRC.    
 One big concession that was necessary in order to limit the study was to not 
incorporate a comprehensive analysis of the conflict in Darfur. This conflict contains its own 
complex aspects that would not be covered adequately in this study. However, it would also 
be impossible to exclude this as well. The compromise is to draw experience and examples 
from the Darfur conflict in a case approach, but avoid any in-depth analysis of root causes. 
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1.4.2 Research design 
 There are miscellaneous variations to how one can approach a research question. The 
most significant separation is the one of qualitative and quantitative. However, there are many 
ways to use different approaches and also combine these. The research design is the choice of 
how the groundwork is done in order to connect the question to the conclusion. This study 
focuses on the conflict in Sudan, whereas it is debatably one or two units of analysis, with 
regards to how one looks at it. As Galtung (1967:37) says: “the human mind usually sees 
some basis for generating sets of elements or units so that a unit only rarely is seen as 
completely unique”.  
Independent variables in the research questions are the secession and the CPA. In 
order to assess how they affect the dependent variables, respectively; the power sharing 
relation between North- and South Sudan; and the sources of conflict, Robert Yin (2003:9) 
suggest that a single case study is an adequate approach, based on that the situation is so large 
that any other approach would seem effortless.  
 
1.4.3 Reliability and validity 
 Reliability measures to what extent the study will reach the same consistent results if 
tried again. If another person does the same study, that person shall ideally reach the same 
conclusion (May 2001:92). In social science, this is not always the case, mostly because the 
study subjects may change over time. As for this thesis, where focus on a conflict that has 
changed largely after the secession has a lot of potential flaws when it comes to reliability. 
Some of these problems are minimized by the approach selected in this study to view the 
conflict as a process that didn’t end with the secession. However, it is most likely that it 
would prove difficult to repeat this study based on its premises. Effectively, a narrow case 
study like this should not serve as the basis for any generalizations.  
 Validity is a method of measuring the accuracy of what has been intended to study. To 
ensure this, the interpretive instruments, data quality and results have to be questioned. 
Galtung (1967:29) formulates the principle of validity as such: “Data shall be obtained of 
such a kind and in such a way that legitimate inferences can be made from the manifest level 
to the latent level”. In comparison to qualitative studies, there are no mathematical formulas 
that need evaluation, but a thorough look through sources and the construction of research 
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question, operationalizing and theoretical framework. The potential this study has to lack 
validity is mainly based on its reliance on secondary sources. However the work when it 
comes to finding and selecting sources is an important part of the work to ensure validity. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 The thesis is divided into five chapters. First, this chapter has provided a description of 
the historical context that precedes the focus of the study. It is important to have a certain 
understanding of where the separation from Arabs and non-Arabs derive from and why it 
became so entrenched, as this is an important feature to the conflict and to this study. Further 
on, this chapter has stipulated the research question and the framework for interpreting this in 
line with the author. It is important to be concise when it comes to these formulations in order 
to make the thoughts behind the study accessible for the reader. With regards to the 
magnitude and history of the conflict to be studied, as well as the short span in time back to 
the referendum, there are a lot of limitations to how one can properly achieve any reliable 
information. These issues have been reflected on here, along with some thoughts on why the 
study can be significant.  
Chapter two will focus on power sharing and secession, along with the theory and discussion 
that follows these constructions. What is interesting with regards to the Sudanese conflict is 
that there are so many layers of power sharing; the central government and the rest; the 
intricate system of tribes all over the country have own local power relations; Southern 
politics, whereas the power relations are very skewed in favor of the liberation movement 
SPLM. To further exemplify issues that are connected to power sharing in peace agreements, 
a case from the Arusha agreement in Rwanda will be drawn experience from, with a 
comparing to the situation in Darfur. With a discussion of power sharing as the foundation, it 
should be simpler for the reader to follow the argument in the last part of chapter three, when 
it comes to secession theory. The aim is to convey the complexity of secession, to 
counterweigh the general perception that a referendum, a loosely drawn border line and a 
currency changes the conflict at a fundamental level. 
 To facilitate the understanding of Sudanese society, the context for the structures that 
prevails today and the most important problems that has created conflict in the past, chapter 
three will consist of a short descriptive analysis of significant historic eras in Sudan up until 
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the end of the first civil war. In order to support the argument in this thesis that conflict is 
dynamic and can prevail despite peace agreements and secession for many reasons, this 
chapter  will draw upon theoretical framework of Johan Galtung’s structural violence in 
combination with theories of Complex Political Emergencies in order to use both their holistic 
approach to matters of conflict. This enables a perspective of the conflict as a process where 
conflict and violence can exist without war, and it is as important to focus on divisions in the 
larger society than the immediate concerns of two warring parties . The aim of this approach 
is to continue this notion of conflict onward to the CPA, in order to learn from previous 
mistakes, but also to serve as the foundation for understanding the argument that will follow 
in chapter three, that secession has to be understood as a change in the same conflict and not 
necessarily the end of a war.  
 With this premise as the basis, chapter four will assess the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement thoroughly. The chapter will follow the structure of the CPA, so that the 
discussion follows the agreements dynamics. The aim will be to answer research question 2a 
and 2b: if the CPA address the sources of conflict and subsequently what sources of conflict 
remain unresolved. An important focus when analyzing the CPA in this manner will be to 
utilize the experience drawn from the Addis Ababa Agreement and from secession theory. 
That way, it is possible to identify which challenges that can arise after a secession for both 
countries. 
 Conclusively, the aim of the thesis is to have contributed to a new understanding of the 
conflict in Sudan. Chapter five will provide a summary of the thesis based on the research 
questions and to what extent this study could answer them. It is also interesting to establish 
whether there are any aspects that proved to be difficult to answer through this study, or if the 
study raised any new questions that could be used for further studies. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
Chapter one has provided a short historical- and the methodological premises for this 
study. The conflict in Sudan has proven to be truly complex and long-lasting. The aim of this 
thesis is to critically analyze the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in order to find its 
weaknesses and future challenges in the aftermath of the agreements implication. The study 
draws upon historical aspects of the conflict in order to understand root causes; secession 
Stellenbosch Univeristy  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
11 
 
theory in order to understand the challenges that may arise from dividing a state, especially in 
such a complex state as Sudan when it comes to ethnicity, religion and sense of belonging; 
and an understanding of conflict as more than the static concepts of war and peace, but a 
dynamic that changes its state between those continuously.  
 In order to reach these conclusions, the study will use a descriptive analysis of already 
existing literature, whereas most of it is regarding the conflict between North- and South 
Sudan. This is not a comparative study, but experience is drawn from the history of conflict 
that lead to the CPA, in order to understand what the important challenges is. The only other 
external example is taken from the peace process in Rwanda, not to compare to Sudanese 
conflict, but to understand the critique from secession theory.  
 The following chapter will provide a descriptive analysis of the historical context of 
Sudan with an emphasis on some aspects that were important to understand how society is 
today; this including the Addis Ababa Agreement and its failure. The aim will be to create an 
understanding of the dynamic of the conflict from then to now and to introduce a way of 
perceiving the conflict as a complex situation which will be an important premise in order to 
understand the critique of the CPA that this study puts forward. 
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Chapter 2: A theoretical view on the referendum: Power sharing and 
secession 
2.1 Introduction 
 According to the Machakos Protocol of 2002 Part B, article 2.5, an internationally 
monitored referendum is to be held at the end of a six year interim period. During this period, 
the Government of National Unity was to establish institutions and “make unity attractive” for 
the people of Sudan. The thought behind this was to preserve the country as a whole, but to 
change the power structure in order to take the conflict down to a political level. As explained 
earlier, Dr. Garang wished for a solution based on unity rather than secession. In order to 
achieve this, the interim government would have to establish a positive view on a central 
government that the South had been fighting against for many years, a difficult task at best. 
U.S. Ambassador Jendayi Frazer points out that the NCP are relying on “short-sighted tactical 
maneuver, coercion and intimidation rather than a strategic reorientation to persuade 
Southerners that they have a place in a unified Sudan” (Frazer 2011). As this might not have 
been the best approach in order to convey a notion of trust and positive prospects of unity, the 
referendum became an illustration of the immense consensus in the South for secession, 
despite Dr. Garang’s initial wish for unity.  
 This section will provide a theoretical view on the two options. First the neglected 
option of unity through power sharing, followed by secession theory. In retrospect, it might 
appear moot to discuss the neglected options, but it is relevant. First of all, as an academic 
debate this will be important in solving future conflicts, also in Sudan regarding the Darfur 
region. The secession critics raise the concern that this secession might set a precedent for 
other countries that consist of Muslim and Christian populations; in the future it could 
undermine the African continental unity (Frazer 2011). Secondly, as explained earlier, the 
power structures might not change as much as anticipated only because of a more defined 
border, a new flag and another national anthem. South Sudan is still critically entangled with 
the North, politically and economically. A clear example of this regional political 
entanglement is the issue of oil and oil transportation. After the secession, the issue of oil 
pipeline fees almost drove the two countries back to conflict after a long period of fighting in 
the border states (Gettleman 2012). As the conflict can be regarded without country borders, 
the power structures and the rest of the political economy can supersede borders as well. The 
aim of this discussion is to highlight the advantages and pitfalls of each option, to show how it 
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ended up the way it did, and to attempt to explain how the new structures will change and 
might not change the dynamic of the conflict per se.  
 
2.2 Theories on power sharing 
 Although each civil conflict is different and there is always a vast complexity to 
achieving peaceful solutions, the variations in end results can be roughly generalized in just a 
few scenarios. One scenario is a violent conflict where an undisputable winner emerges and 
gain hegemonic control over the whole area and institutional structure. This end result can last 
a long time, as with Sudan, and the cost of human lives can be immense. A second scenario is 
secession, where the warring parts agree on a common border, separating the power 
structures. After the formation of the United Nations, this is a rare happening. The largest 
example of this is the disentanglement of the Soviet Union. A third scenario is that the parties 
can agree on various versions of a power sharing agreement, taking the conflict down to a 
political level.  
 This third option, power sharing is broadly accepted as the best democratic mean when 
it comes to managing conflict in divided societies (O’Flynn & Russell 2005:1). However, 
according to René Lemarchand (2006:2), such agreements have shown unable to prevent the 
reemerging of violence in many different conflicts, like Angola, Liberia, Somalia and 
Ethiopia. Why is this option still enjoying such high regards? The answer may lie close to a 
comment by Anna Jarstad (2006:9): “power sharing is attractive to peace negotiators”. A 
reason for this might be what Sisk (1996:77) describes as a principal assumption that 
permeates power-sharing theory; a belief that appropriate political engineering can succeed in 
constructing an operational political system that is capable of consolidate the parties that 
initiated the conflict and generate a platform where they can resolve the issues that caused the 
escalation of violence.  
 In situations where violence is intense and there is an immediate need to establish 
some sort of agreement, the political actors as well as peace negotiators are inclined to focus 
on what is most important at the time, to halt the use of violence. Although a cease fire is 
crucial in times like those, the institutional framework which emerge through a hasty process 
will most likely resonate with the claims of Jarstad and Sisk; a power sharing agreement that 
is reflecting the primary interests of the particular violent groups, as a key means of reducing 
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tension and halt the use of violence. In the aftermath, there will always appear unforeseen 
problems that were not discussed or agreed upon initially, but still can have major 
implications for the future of the political collaboration. In the case of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, this issue can be illustrated by the fact that the parties agreed upon many 
important issues at the time, like the composition of the armed forces, amnesty and judicial 
arrangements and the political composition of the new regime (The agreement 1972). 
However, it did not provide a framework for how to solve land ownership issues and sharing 
of oil revenue that emerged shortly after, when oil was discovered in the border areas. This is 
a perfect example of unforeseen issues that may emerge and ruin the peace process. From a 
retrospective standpoint, one can see such obstacles, but for a negotiator or a politician it is 
difficult to pinpoint every possible issue that may arise in addition to create a consensus on 
theoretical situations. O’Flynn and Russel (2005:2) argue that in political institutions need to 
be established with enough flexibility within the system to make it more feasible to anticipate 
and respond to changing political imperatives. To establish a sustainable political regime 
through a rapid peace negotiating process is by default an immense challenge. There have to 
be many unforeseen variables, and in many cases, some groups will be overlooked in the 
process; most likely the weakest parts of the society. Arguably, the process of reaching a 
power-sharing agreement through external negotiations is not necessarily very democratic in 
its nature. 
 
2.2.1 Power sharing and democracy 
 What is democracy? The etymology of the word shows that it derives from the Greek 
words dēmos and kratia which mean ‘the people’ and ‘power rule’ (Oxford dictionaries 
2011b). In modern times, democracy has obtained many connotations, and there is no 
unanimous consensus on what constitutes a democracy. Diamond and Plattner (2006:90) 
argues that in order to become a democracy, a regime must meet two fundamental conditions; 
the regime must respect the distinction between the private and the public spheres; and it must 
“diffuse power” by separating control over the public sphere among various levels and centers 
of authority. By this, they mean that decision making should be reserved for the level closest 
to the citizen. So a democracy shall protect its people and make decisions that regard them 
accessible to them; but for many, democracy means more, liberal democracies will also be 
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measured by its value system if there’s equality amongst the citizens, freedom of speech and 
movement, inclusion, etc.  
 According to the Sterling Professor emeritus of political science at Yale University 
Robert Alan Dahl (1989:84), most of the arguments for democracy will in the end come back 
to the value of intrinsic equality. The interpretation of this value is that each individual in a 
society has independent moral standing and is thereby valuable in his or hers own right. 
Although every society has its flaws when it comes to taking care of every individual and 
their rights, the concept of intrinsic equality provides a good aim for measuring democracy; if 
many individuals rights are being offended, it is hard to justify democratic values. However, 
Dahl accepted that the upholding of this value was not sufficient, because it only entail that 
representatives for the individual provide equal consideration to each person’s interest, but 
does not solve the question of who can judge what interest is best, and who can safeguard 
these interests in the best possible manner. To answer these questions, Dahl simply answered 
that each individual is the best judge of its own interests and the appropriate person to bring 
them out. He terms this a second fundamental value called the assumption of personal 
autonomy, and regards this as a justification to create a more robust democratic model (Dahl 
1989:99). 
 With such a normative foundation, there is no state that can effectively live up to a 
status as democracy. However, it is possible to argue that with a legal framework that will 
treat everyone equal, a political system where everyone have to possibility to participate and 
be heard and a well-functioning local democracy, many of these values are appropriately 
upheld. Without discussing modern democratic standards any further, it should still be 
possible to assess what these democratic values mean in a peace process, and what the 
implications are when they are severely lacking.  
 
2.2.2 Power sharing and consociationalism 
  In 1969, Arend Lijphart published an article called “Consociational Democracy”, 
which laid the groundwork for a theory on power sharing that had a huge impact on how 
analysts thought about democratic governance (Lijphart 2008:3). Lemarchand (2006:3) 
describes consociationalism as a “notion of elite cooperation through a grand coalition 
cabinet, where executive power is shared by opposition and majority parties”. Further on, the 
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most important part that captures the essence of this approach is three conditions: First, group 
autonomy, meaning that when issues of common interests are to be decided upon, all 
members of the coalition cabinet shall be a part of the process; on all other issues, the 
respective community or region in which the issue regards shall be free do decide 
autonomously. This condition does not only resembles Dahl’s assumption of personal 
autonomy, but also an important principle in the European Union, the subsidiary principle, 
stated in Article 5 of the principles (EUT 2006:E46). This principle states that all that matters 
ought to be handled by the smallest, lowest or least centralized competent authority. 
 The second condition is that the standard of all political representation, financial 
redistribution and similar services should be based on proportionality. The aim of this 
condition is to ensure a fair representation for minorities. Further on, the last condition, and 
maybe the most controversial one is the minority veto. This gives minorities a position in 
government where they can bargain and use leverage that only the majority can in traditional 
power sharing constellations. Lijphart recommends that this tool should not be used too often, 
and only with regard to issues of fundamental importance, if to keep it valuable and pragmatic 
in governance (Lijphart 1990:495).  
 The main critique of consociationalism as a power sharing constellation is that it’s 
undemocratic. At its worst, consociationalism excludes the opposition and cements the power 
structures with one group, the minorities; which is inherently undemocratic. Some critics 
claim that this kind of politics does not give any incentive to keep government honest, but 
rather give a large amount of power to small unserious actors  (O’Leary 2005:6). In the next 
part of this chapter, one example from a peace agreement in Rwanda will illustrate one aspect 
that is problematic regarding small groups in larger conflicts. By identifying this problem, 
some light can be shed on the unresolved issues in Sudan regarding minorities and lack of 
access to the political system.  
 
2.2.3 Case: The failure of the Arusha Agreement in Rwanda 
 This is not to be regarded as an analysis of the peace process in Rwanda, but a 
summary of some important events that lead to a breakdown of one peace agreement. As with 
most societies and conflicts, the situation is more complex than it is possible to confine to a 
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few pages. The aim of this part is to identify those aspects that can be useful in regards to 
theory and power sharing along with the peace process in Sudan.  
 In 1993, the government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) signed a 
peace agreement that was going to put an end to the conflict between the two parties that had 
lasted for three years. The purpose of this agreement was to establish a transitional 
constitution and a transitional government based on a broad foundation (Arusha Accords 
1993). According to the agreement, the power-sharing was supposed to divide the cabinet 
positions in the transitional government between six of the larger movements in the country, 
representing various fractions of the two large ethnic groups in the country, Hutu and Tutsi 
(Lemarchand 2006:4,5). This agreement was never implemented, because of the actions that 
followed it. Adelman and Suhrke (1996:5) reported of signs that the implementation of the 
agreement were faltering and that there were preparation of violence, shortly after the signing. 
Extremist rhetoric was on the radio, in public rallies and even occurred at official happenings. 
In general, violence became more frequent in the society. The UN Mission in Rwanda 
(UNAMIR) reported of military training of militias, hidden arms caches and plotting of 
violent actions.  
 Despite the fact that the UN was present with military forces in the country, and they 
had the mandate to provide support when implementing the peace agreement, they appeared 
helpless when the situation changed for the worse. No preparations were made to deal with 
the breakdown of the Arusha Accords, except to withdraw. When the violence escalated and 
the underfinanced UN administration in the area experienced casualties, the killing of 10 
Belgian peacekeepers, the peacekeeping force was reduced drastically. The reason behind this 
was mostly external politics; the contributing countries lost their support for the operation at 
home (Adelman & Suhrke 1996:6).  
 In the aftermath of the atrocities that followed these events, many were blamed; the 
UN for lack of leadership and failure to intervene and protect civilians; the media which 
incorrectly covered the escalating violence in coherence with stereotypical notions of tribal 
violence and killing orgies, failing to convey the political power struggle and ethnically 
motivated executions (Adelman & Suhrke 1996:7). Mahmood Mamdani (2001:14) uses a 
historic context in his explanation, explaining how the Tutsi had a “privileged relationship to 
power” before the colonial occupation, when they were constructed as the ‘alien’ presence in 
the area. With this argument the process was long and tied to ethnic relations to both power 
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and soil, whereas he argues that the killings were not ethnic cleansings, but a campaign to 
eliminate a foreign presence from the homeland.  
 Causality, root causes and triggering effects all play a part in the culmination of a 
conflict, and in this context it is interesting to compare structural elements when it comes to 
the peace agreement itself. Ian Spears (2010:110) describes the Arusha Accords as the perfect 
example of a failed power sharing. The argument behind this is one group called the 
Convention pour la défense de la république (CDR), a pro-Hutu movement refused to 
cooperate and thus was excluded from the negotiations and the agreement. With much tension 
between the ethnic groups and one armed extremist group with connection to the President 
Habyarimana excluded, the power structure was not proportional and there were no autonomy 
for groups or persons that would seem equal or fair on both sides. 
 Lemarchand (2006:5) puts forward an explanation based on the civil war in context in 
which the Accords were negotiated. During the peace talks, the participants constantly 
regrouped on the battlefield to gain relative advantages in order to use this as leverage over 
the negotiation table. This was a tactic of cynical realism where military strength was used 
actively as a political means. Lemarchand (2006:6) characterized these negotiations as 
“Reversing the Clausewitzian aphorism, the Arusha negotiations can best be though f as the 
continuation of civil war by other means”. Such a negotiating climate was built on fear and 
anxieties on both sides, which made it very difficult to establish a feasible option of a power-
sharing mechanism.  
 
2.2.4 Power sharing in Sudan 
 There are many significant differences between the conflict in Rwanda and in Sudan. 
Without comparing the conflicts per se, but the problems relating to power sharing, it is 
possible to assess what aspects of the power constellation in Sudan have the potential of 
escalating into violence or in other ways lead to regression in the peace process. First of all, 
after the secession between North- and South Sudan, this constellation changed fundamentally 
and arguably into three distinct constellations which are interconnected; power sharing in the 
North contra the South as their own autonomous regions; and power sharing between the two 
states. This section will discuss the two new autonomous states and how the new power 
structure will affect them internally. After the secession, the problems facing the two states 
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are very different. North Sudan still has many unresolved issues with regards to ethnic 
diversity and autonomy, while South Sudan will need to establish a regime that encompass 
the whole country despite its diversity; it needs to establish sovereign monopoly of violence 
and security; it needs to establish a working relationship with the North.  
 
2.2.5 Comparing Darfur and Rwanda 
 Between 2001 and 2003, a series of smaller conflicts exacerbated in the area of Darfur, 
which is a state located west in the Sudan. A local governance collapse laid the foundation for 
insecurity and frustration, which the provincial elite used to fuel an insurgency. The 
magnitude of this conflict increased rapidly, and provoked a response from the government in 
Khartoum. The reaction was overly proportional and violent; a massacre that lead to the loss 
of more than 70 000 civilian lives and millions of refugees (Straus 2005:123). In many ways, 
the conflict between the North and the South is interconnected with the one in Darfur; 
SPLM/A are supporting the Darfur rebels in their armed resistance against the Khartoum 
regime. The root causes in both conflicts are founded in the relationship with the central 
government. Alex De Waal (2007:1040) argues that “the basic pattern of grievances is shared 
by all the marginalized people: they were denied their share in political power and national 
wealth, and the government used divide-and-rule tactics to allow local militias to run amok 
and destroy their modest livelihoods”. In the case of Darfur, the Khartoum regime provided 
military and financial support to the Janjaweed militia, a fraction of the Arab camel-herding 
tribes of the area; using them in proxy warfare against the rebels. De Waal rhetorically states 
that it is not difficult to understand why the war broke out, but rather why it didn’t happen 
sooner.  
 By 8 April 2004, the immense humanitarian catastrophe came to a halt after the 
Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the conflict in Darfur. This agreement 
allowed the AU to monitor the ceasefire together with a force that could provide protection 
for the monitors (Ndjameda Agreement 2004). The reality was that the African Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) was an understaffed unit with a limited mandate, operating in a vast area. 
After a long period of international pressure, especially from the US and China, a joint UN-
AU mission was constituted. This became operational in 2008 (De Waal 2007:1043). As the 
Professor in African History Rex Seán O’Fahey (2006) argues, the Khartoum government has 
the upper hand in Darfur, seeing that they have curbed the liberty of the AU, international 
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Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO) and the UNMIS. By doing this, they achieved their 
goal, to ensure least possible international involvement in Darfur.  
 The conflict in Rwanda and the one in Darfur are utterly different on many levels; 
there are no similar conflicts, as they are complex processes of various societies, time aspects 
and different people. However, when comparing the two cases, it is interesting to point out 
some of the factors that were highlighted as central to the outbreak of violence in Rwanda that 
can be found in the conflict in Darfur as well. This can help pinpointing some of the important 
issues to come in the Sudanese peace process post-CPA. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 
(2008:880) compares the two conflicts in order to illustrate a broader global importance when 
it comes to changing ethno-political ideologies and state-level entrepreneurship in genocidal 
processes. How the state acts in these conflicts is very decisive for the development of the 
conflict; in Rwanda, Hutu- and Tutsi people often intermarried and was in many instances 
impossible to tell apart, the argument is that it was the government in Rwanda that ran 
negatively connoted propaganda campaigns to enforce these divisions, whereas one good 
example of this is the forced use of identity cards that would state what ethnicity the holder 
belonged to. Centrally construed ethnic divisions are still prevailing in Sudan; although 
there’s a long history of racial division in many parts of this country, there is also a history of 
coexistence. Even as late as the 1970s there were normal periods where Darfur was regarded 
as an area where Africans and Arabs lived as equals (Flint & De Waal 2005:3). The 
conflictual development started to escalate along with the central governments ta’rib policy, 
and culminated with the war that happened at the brink of the millennium. It is difficult to 
provide any explanation to this conflict that doesn’t involve the regime in Khartoum as an 
important instigator.  
 Another factor that made the peace process in Rwanda difficult was the exclusion of 
some groups, whereas one was the armed militia group CDR that has been labeled as an 
extremist Hutu movement, as mentioned earlier. The situation in Darfur does also have an 
element of armed militia, in fact on both sides of the conflict. The Janjaweed militia was one 
of the more contentious issues when negotiating peace in Darfur. The AU and the 
international actors was that the Janjaweed needed to be disarmed. According to De Waal 
(2007:1050), the task of forcefully disarm any militia would be impossible, even for the 
government in Sudan. For UNAMID, instead of attempting to carry out a disarmament 
campaign on militias in Darfur, they chose to rather keep good relations with the more 
important tribal and militia leaders. This was perceived as the best option, to avoid 
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confrontation between Arab militia and the UN peace keeping force. In essence, Darfur 
became an area loaded with weapons, divided by ethnic tensions and confined by an 
underfunded peace keeping force with limited mandate; much like Rwanda 1993. 
 
2.3 Theories on secession 
For six years people in Southern Sudan could argue, debate and contemplate whether they 
wanted to be a part of the Sudan as before, or if they wanted to constitute a new state. As was 
the wish of former leader of the SPLM, John Garang de Mabior, the option of a united Sudan 
was something that the regime in the North would have to work towards; to prove that it 
would be beneficial for the Southerners. At the end of the interim period, little had been done 
to charm the people of the south; even much of the implementation of the CPA had been 
postponed. To turn the will of a people which have been mortal enemies for decades, proved 
impossible, and in 2011 the secession was a fact; a new country was born.  
 Secession in Sudan followed a group of nations that gained their independence 
through seceding from their mother countries. In Africa, the best example of a country born 
from seceding is Eritrea, which through great human costs managed to successfully break 
away from Ethiopia (Amaku 2011). But as an idea, secession has been around as long as it 
has been states. As some groups or even regions within a state do not feel that they can accept 
the ties to their government as they are, some attempts at secession will probably always find 
place as long as there are states, some more serious than others. Although the concept of 
secession is fairly easy to grasp; one unit want to separate itself from the state, the question of 
morality and the attitude from the international community is not that easily resolved. Kreptul 
(2003:46) questions on what grounds it is okay for a group to justify secession. One argument 
that follows is that a group of citizens can only secede rightfully if it has suffered certain 
injustices, for which secession is the appropriate remedy of last resort. These normative 
theories on secession are called Remedial right only theories, and are based on John Locke’s 
theory where people only have the right to overthrow their government if their fundamental 
rights are violated. But is it morally wrong to secede from a state that is perfectly just? Some 
theories assert that groups can have the right to secede even in the absence of injustice; these 
are called Primary right theories (Buchanan 1997:31). Robert McGee (1994:18) argues that 
one can find one of the strongest arguments in favor of secession in the US Declaration of 
Independence: “whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the 
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right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government”. However the 
rights or ethical discussion over secession goes, effectively it often comes down to realist 
issues of power relations or at least capacity issues. This section of Chapter three will discuss 
the theory on secession and how it applies to the case of South Sudan.  
 
2.3.1 Understanding secession 
 To cover the most basic understanding of secession, it is defined in this paper in 
accordance with Pavković and Radan’s definition: “Secession is the creation of a new state by 
the withdrawal of a territory and its population where that territory was previously part of an 
existing state” (Pavković & Radan 2007:5). Of course, the territory is not withdrawn in a 
literal sense, but the act of secession means that the institutions of the host country will lose 
jurisdiction over the seceded state. It is the political, legal and coercive powers of the host 
state that in effect is withdrawn from the seceded territory (Pavković & Radan 2007:8). In 
order to successfully secede, the new state needs new features and new institutions; new 
name, restructuring of former government structures to facilitate a new government, new 
border demarcation and in the case of South Sudan a new currency as well.  
 Although the technical aspects of a secession can be challenging for a new state, as 
also is one of the main critiques of South Sudan, the lack of capacity, this chapter is going to 
focus on the theoretical aspects of secession, the attitudes in the international community 
towards secession, and explain how the seceded country still can be as dependent on the host 
country after a secession. But first, how does a group go about to secede? First the group need 
acceptance from the host country; if there is no resistance and the people of the new state 
manage to create a functioning state, there is little to stop it; however in most cases the host 
country does not want to accept secession, thus creating a conflict of interests.  Pavković and 
Radan (2007:1) explain that the world has witnessed conflict and violence with a secessionist 
agenda, but it rarely is portrayed like this in the media. In many instances, the struggle for 
secession is rather portrayed as a struggle for ‘independence’. One reason for this may be that 
secession is regarded as a word with negative connotations to it. This might have to with the 
established notion in international law that breach of territorial integrity is prohibited 
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2.3.2 Secession in International Law 
 The Montevideo Convention of 1933 codified the declarative theory of statehood as 
the accepted part of customary international law, meaning that there was an established 
consensus within the international community that the declaration made at this convention 
should be the applicable law on this area. Article 1 in the declaration stipulates that “the state 
as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent 
population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with 
the other states” (Montevideo convention 1933). However, the reality is not always this 
simple, in international law, there are no consensus to how secession should be dealt with. 
Brilmayer (1991:177) forwards the paradox of available international law which is applicable 
to the subject: the principle of self-determination of people within international law suggests 
that every person has the right to its own nation-state; whereas another equally venerable 
principle upholds territorial integrity of existing states.  
 Secession conflicts with the principle of sovereignty, which was one of the founding 
principles of the UN, and can to some extent be regarded as an important reason to the 
relative peace in the world after the Second World War. In the Charter of the United Nations, 
Article two states that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...” 
(UN Charter 1945). When a group attempts to secede from a state, by default they deny the 
host state territorial integrity. If accepted by the international community, this can participate 
in weakening the principle of sovereignty, which can be regarded as a problem by itself 
(Bodley 1998:417). Through various processes, secessions do happen. In international law, 
there are two main schools of thought when it comes to recognizing a new state. The 
declaratory theory contributes all power to the seceding country; if a state can meet the 
requirements of statehood as they are stipulated in the Montevideo convention, the 
recognition from other states are merely a formal statement of facts. On the other side, the 
constitutive theory the only way to achieve statehood is to be recognized by other states. For 
South Sudan, the international community recognized the state, which ensures the states 
relation to others; specifically important was the recognition from the US and the Obama 
administration (Spetalnick 2011). 
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2.3.3 Measuring harms and benefits of potential secession 
 Another paradox that secession theory encounters is the democratic aspect; the 
political theorist Harry Beran forwarded the democratic theory which argues that the only 
valid procedure through which secession can become permissible is through majority 
decision-making procedure (Pavković & Radan 2007:202). Beran asks if a liberal democracy 
should include the right to secede; if it is morally legitimate for a minority that doesn’t 
acknowledge the unity of the state to withdraw. In some cases, he argues, secession should be 
prohibited; if the secessionist group is too small to assume the basic responsibilities of an 
independent state; if the occupied area is culturally, economically or military essential to the 
existing state; or if the secessionist group seeks to exploit sub-groups within itself and is not 
prepared to let other groups secede (Beran in McGee 1994:12). Many observers referred to 
South Sudan as a ‘pre-failed’ state, on the basis of the government’s lack of ability to enforce 
basic functions in the time after the referendum (Foreign Policy 2012). 
 When applying Beran’s theory to the case of South Sudan, some concerns should be 
raised. One is the capacity of the new state; this was a major problem which led to discontent 
from many groups after the 1972 peace agreement, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Omeje (2010:29) showed in a study the prospects of the state of South Sudan to become a 
fragile rentier state, raising the concern that a major problem would be to strategically 
transform the “potentially dysfunctional rentier base of its economy, marked by over-
dependence on oil resources”. Another report made by the United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP) shows that regarding the nation building project, South Sudanese people are mostly 
worried about exclusion from the national platform, especially along ethnic lines (USIP 
2011:1). Both these reports point to plausible concerns that Beran assert in his democratic 
theory as reasons why it might not be morally legitimate to secede. For instance, a 
humanitarian catastrophe or new civil war internally in South Sudan could destabilize not 
only the country itself, but leave the North in a majorly advanced position when it comes to 
power relations. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) conducted a quantitative study to assess the 
discourse of secessionist movements from a Political Economy perspective. They found that 
secession in low-income countries carried the largest potential of danger. In addition to this, 
the most dangerous countries when looking at social compositions are those in which the 
largest ethnic group is in a majority, but with a significant minority present, much like Sudan. 
“Our results suggest that a reduction in ethnic and religious fractionalization is likely to 
increase the danger of civil war rather than diminish it” (Collier & Hoeffler (2002:26).  One 
Stellenbosch Univeristy  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
25 
 
example to illustrate this when Slovenia and Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia, then the Serb 
ethnicity became so massively dominant in the remaining territory, which may have 
contributed to the violence and atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo in the aftermath. As argued in 
the previous section, there is a potential that Darfur can develop in such a detrimental fashion 
in the post-CPA era. 
McGee criticizes these attempts to prohibit secession on moral grounds. When it 
comes to the argument to prohibit secession on the grounds of cultural, economic or military 
strategy reasoning is problematic because culture belongs to the people (McGee 1994:14). To 
further build on McGee’s critique, one can apply Dahl’s principle of personal autonomy, 
which infers that democracy is stronger the closer to the people from the state it is. This logic 
applies to the conflict in Sudan where an important source of conflict is the cultural aspect, 
the South fights to preserve its cultural heritage.  
 It is evident that the problem of measuring harms and benefits of secession 
complicates the debate of legitimacy within international law. Pavković and Radan 
(2007:209) asks “If there is no general agreement how to measure harms and benefits 
resulting from secessions, how could one use the criteria of harm and benefit for the purposes 
of regulating international recognition of secessions?” Although South Sudan receive 
international recognition, mostly because of remedial reasons concerning the long civil war 
and the difficult relations to the Khartoum regime, there are also arguments why a secession 
may prove to create new conflicts in addition to continue the former. The next part of this 
chapter will assess some important challenges that the regime and people of South Sudan 
have to meet. 
 
2.3.4 Security issues in South Sudan after the secession 
 The years preceding the referendum in South Sudan were difficult. Local violence rose 
to a level that surpassed Darfur in terms of killings during 2009. This has proven to be a 
major source of insecurity for the people in South Sudan. After the end of the interim period 
and the establishment of the new state, the question if this level of violence will continue will 
be tremendously important. Will South Sudan fall into a new civil conflict, and how will that 
affect the highly tense relationship with the North? Rolandsen (2010:2) points to an 
institutional problem regarding the increased violence; when a lack of confidence in the 
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state’s capacity to protect its own population and to prosecute perpetrators it can lead to 
lawlessness and vigilantism. When there are many groups and people in the country with 
military capability, this lowers the threshold for violence in the society and increase the effect 
significantly. In a worst case scenario, a new violent conflict could emerge from this.  
 One of the most important functions of a state is to create security for its citizens by 
securing a monopoly on the use of violence. In order to enforce this, the primary institution is 
the police. In South Sudan, police is mostly consisting of former SPLA soldiers that lack 
training in civil police work and basic education. Problems are many; there is not enough 
manpower to sufficiently cover the areas they are supposed to secure; lack of transportation 
and communication resources hinders effective response to security issues; lack of command 
and control. In some cases, the police are also victims of attacks. In 2008, a clan attacked a 
police station in order to kill a perpetrator that had been arrested previously; they achieved 
this by setting fire to his cell (HRW 2009:21). Besides the fact that the police force is unable 
to maintain a monopoly of violence, there are also reports of police brutality. According to 
Human Rights Watch, the police in Malakal fired into a crowd when a group of traditional 
dancers were arguing over which group was going to take the lead in the celebration. The 
incident caused two ethnic groups to commence fighting in a nearby village, whereas eleven 
people were killed and houses were burned down (HRW 2009:21). 
 As argued, much of this violence can be contributed to the amount of weapons and 
military equipment that’s scattered around with local tribes and gangs. However, Schomerus 
(2008:23) accentuates another aspect that relates especially to the SPLA soldiers. The post-
CPA period can be perceived from their angle as difficult; an uncertain and unstructured time 
where they may be required to participate in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR), but without any real prospects of a future as civilians. It is important to emphasize 
that the conflict in Sudan has lasted so long that many of these people only know how to be 
soldiers; the peace process takes this away from them and provide an unpredictable future. 
The director of the Community Security and Arms Control Bureau (CSAC), Dr Riak Gok, 
communicated a certain problem with getting former SPLA soldiers to perform tasks that they 
weren’t used to from before, and that they tend to turn back to the use of force when they are 
provoked (Schomerus 2008:23). An interesting remark is that the GoSS wanted to use a 
civilian disarmament program in order to “defuse an increasingly precarious security 
environment (O’Brien 2009:18), which is what was considered too much of a risk in Darfur 
by the UNAMID.  
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 By drawing the link back to the case from Rwanda, the violence in South Sudan after 
the CPA is not as politically motivated. Cases of violence is often, as showed here local or 
connected with local feuds and not attempts to overthrow the government or seize power. The 
difference is that the political in South Sudan is weak. Outside of Juba, there are only a few 
substantial movements, these are found close to the state capitals, and do not have the 
capacity to create any country wide campaigns (ICG 2011:16). Such is the situation in South 
Sudan a lot better than both Darfur and Rwanda; however the problem of local militia is still 
precarious. Human Rights Watch (2009:17) reports of various armed criminal groups and 
renegade soldiers which are committing abuses against civilians. One of these groups is the 
‘Forgotten Warriors’, which attacked civilians in the Upper Nile, raping and looting. Such 
groups are growing in numbers as the peace process move forward. This trend is a 
predicament for the new government; do they choose to disarm these militias, which is the 
cause of the problem? Or do they choose to keep the level of arms high in the area, with 
regards to the conflict with the North? Maybe disarmament of larger parts of the SPLA could 
leave South Sudan weak in a potential escalation in the conflict with Khartoum in the future.  
  
2.4 Conclusion 
 Through this chapter, this study has identified power structures at many levels in the 
conflict. In conflict resolution, the parts often come to terms with a power sharing structure, 
some more complex than others, in order to continue a peace process. However, many peace 
processes fail to maintain these power structures for a long time, as it were with the relative 
short peace after the Addis Ababa Agreement. One aspect that is problematic regarding this 
topic is the top-down approach; power sharing should be intricately linked to democracy. By 
using Dahl’s approach to democracy, the study illustrated the span that exists between a peace 
process amongst two elite parties and external negotiators and the actual people.  
 One approach to power sharing that has been most important when it comes to such 
negotiations is consociationalism, where the power sharing is modified to facilitate the 
minority perspective by creating a power sharing constellation where minorities are 
represented and have real negotiating power through a veto mechanism or such.  
 The case of the Arusha Agreement in Rwanda showed first and foremost that these 
processes are not failsafe; there are many considerations and unforeseen consequences. By 
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identifying some of the problems with regards to the power sharing arrangements in this 
situation, these lessons could be applied to the Sudanese conflict. When looking at Darfur, 
some striking similarities raise caution, especially the fact that both was centrally construed 
dual ethnic conflicts and that armed extremist militia fuelled by the perception of ethnic 
incompatibility were excluded from the peace agreement. Darfur and the other areas with 
non-Arab groups in North Sudan remain a contentious focus point throughout this thesis; also 
when it comes to the secession. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2002) the quantitative data 
suggest that secession could increase the danger of a conflict rather than diminish it, because 
the majority in the host country becomes so dominant in the relationship to the minority.  
 An analysis of secession theory gave an ambiguous result. Some theories suggest a 
positive outlook for the seceded country, based on recognition from the international 
community and the fulfillment of the Montevideo Convention criterions. However, there are 
moral backsides of secession with regards to majority democratic standards as well as 
capacity issues. Especially the former is important for South Sudan; there are many 
challenges that hinder a successful development of a new sustainable state. These will be 
further explored in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 3: Making peace happen – The process that led to the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 A historic moment for South Sudan was marked in January 2011, as the people 
registered as South Sudanese showed up to the voting ballots in order to decide the future of 
their own region. Whether to stay united with northern Sudan and continue the difficult 
cooperation that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) established, or to secede as an 
own nation state with all the various advantages and challenges that this could imply. This 
referendum was the culmination of a six year long process initiated by the National Congress 
Party (NCP) and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM) which started in 
2005.  
 The following chapter will outline the peace process in Sudan. Since the independence 
from the British Colonial rule, Sudan has been fighting internally almost consecutively, with 
two attempts on creating peace through an agreement; the Addis Ababa-Agreement of 1972; 
and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. In order to fully understand the 
contemporary challenges when working towards a peaceful transition, it is important to reflect 
on previous attempts towards a lasting peace agreement, why it wasn’t successful and to focus 
on what can be learned from this. The start of this chapter will look into the first civil war in 
Sudan, which led to the Addis Ababa-Agreement of 1972.  
With an overview of this agreement and its context, the next part will discuss the main 
shortcomings of this agreement and why there was a new outbreak of fighting between North- 
and South Sudan. Thereafter, the focus of the chapter will be shifted towards the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, starting with an outline of the process and what the 
different effects and implications were supposed to be, with the aim of explaining why it 
ended up as a power sharing agreement. 
 Using experiences from the past agreements in a new context, following chapters will 
have a foundation for a critical assessment of the CPA and the implications that derived from 
it. It is of utmost importance to recognize that even though the agreements can be similar and 
they derive from the same process, the situation on many levels have changed. Oil has 
become a more important issue; the political situation has changed, especially on the global 
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level with the ICC court’s decision to issue an arrest warrant on Sudan’s President Omar al-
Bashir, together with increased focus on intervention. The regional situation has changed 
dramatically after many revolutions and riots in various North-African countries, destabilizing 
the region. These are just some of many changes that will have to be taken into account when 
looking into the future of Sudan’s peace process.  
 
3.2 A history of occupation, violence and segregation 
 Officially, Sudan has never been colonized by any European power, which makes the 
large country unique as an African state (Rogier 2005:6). However a post-colonialism 
analysis is integral in order to understand modern Sudanese history, seeing that Sudan was 
under the joint control of Egypt and Britain through the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
between 1899 and 1956. In earlier history, the large area which is now known as Sudan has 
been shaped by many eras and over many years. As early as 2700 BC, it is recorded relations 
between Sudan and Egypt, which illustrates the greatness and long span of the history (Metz 
1992:3). The first recorded peace treaty in this area stems from the middle of the seventh 
century, when the baqt treaty was signed between the Christian state of Makuria and the 
Muslim state of Egypt, this peace lasted for almost seven hundred years (Shinnie 1978:566). 
The segregation between Muslims and non-Muslims was apparent and actually dominant 
even in this era. 
 With this in mind, and moving on to contemporary Sudan, a good starting point for 
drawing lines to modern history can be in 1821 when the Ottoman Egyptian Empire, later 
with the help of British military, expanded their borders to include much of northern Sudan, 
the Nile valley, Blue Nile and Kordofan (Rogier 2005:7). At this time the North-South 
division started to become more entrenched. Later, this segregation was reinforced again by 
the Mahdist state, a regime which was initiated by an internal revolt in Khartoum by 
Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abd Allah in 1885. During these times, non-Muslims were regarded 
as second class citizens under the code of dhimma in Sudan, even though, Sudan attracted 
many Egyptians from the Copt church that faced prosecution in their homeland (UNHCR 
2008). Occupation and division became a significant part of Sudanese history again.  
 War and occupation can have many deteriorating effects on people and on a country. 
The most apparent one in the time span between contemporary Sudan and back to the Anglo-
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Egyptian occupation is exactly the entrenchment of separation between Muslims and the 
others, which often was Christian or of other faiths. This division became projected in the 
demography, where the majority of Muslims reside in the north, and the south only consist of 
a Muslim minority. The reason why the separation was kept, but the country not divided was 
because it was more practical for the occupying power to administer them separately. On the 
other side, Egypt wanted to maintain Sudan as a country, hoping to annex the entire area 
under Egyptian rule. With this in mind, was control over the Suez Canal given to the United 
Kingdom (UK) as long as they promised not to separate Sudan (Rogier 2005).  
 As mentioned, post-colonial thoughts have to play a part in an analysis of 
contemporary Sudan. When negotiating over Sudanese independence, the British 
administration didn’t negotiate with any representative selection of the country. Given the 
lack of political organization in the South, the negotiations were only conducted with the 
Arab national movement in the North, which gave Sudan the immediate status as an ‘Arab’ 
state, and subsequently caused a power transfer to the people that were recognized within this 
ethnic group (Rogier 2005:9). Ironically, the British occupation left the country with the 
perceived Arab ethnicities with the power, at the expense of the people of Christian faith.  
 
3.3 Divisions in Sudanese identity  
 The Sudanese identity can be described as dichotomous if not looking closely. 
Muslims are living in the North and people with Christian and tradition beliefs in the South. 
However, this narrative is simplified at best. Rogier (2005:6) states that the division in 
Sudan’s population is cultural-linguistic rather than racial; he further claims that because of 
racial mixing throughout history the country is “one of the most diverse of the African 
continent”. Paglia (2007:13) classifies nine major ethnic groups in the country, whereas all of 
them have to be divided into smaller subgroups. Within her classification, the Arab 
population accounted for 55 percent as the largest ethnic group, followed by the Dinka ethnic 
group consisting of eight percent, Nuba with 6 percent and Nuer with four percent. Statistics 
often tend to hide certain complexities; in this case the groups tend to be overly generalized. 
Arabs are not one heterogeneous group, and neither is Dinka, where there are at least 25 
ethnic subdivisions. Paglia (2007:15) explains that the ethnical complexity of Sudan is not the 
reason for conflict. There is nothing inherent in ethnic identities that are conflictual, and 
people have lived in peace before, despite the diversity in culture, religion or appearance. The 
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core of the problem is rather politically, where the way to power comes through using 
differences, status and inequality to gain support. 
 The process of Arabization, which is called Ta’rib has been working at many levels 
the past hundred years in Sudan (Sharkey 2008:22). The argument that Paglia proposed fits 
very well when looking at how this process words. At the grassroots, this process has worked 
well and without much tension. Arabic is accepted as an important lingua franca in growing 
areas and the culture has spread throughout the country. When looking at the political level, 
the policy of Ta’rib has evoked resentment and violence. Sharkey (ibid) argues that the post-
colonial policy of Arabization has to be blamed for the divisions in society that followed. 
Sudan lost its national identity. People that didn’t identify with Arab culture lost their 
emotional attachment to the central state, thus creating a genuine wish for an alternative, 
which drove the people of South Sudan to fight against the Northern regime. 
During the transition phase when the British administration left, the North gained 
more and more political power from the retreating British powers. Administrative positions in 
the South were taken by Arabs from the North. Historically, the South and the people 
associated with it have been oppressed by the North before. They are often treated as 
worthless people, subjected to slavery and violent attacks. As this fear increased in the 
southern Sudanese populations, a group of people from the South initiated a mutiny in August 
1955, which is regarded as the time when the first civil war started, even before the 
independence was granted.  These people fled into the bushes and regrouped in Uganda. They 
would later emerge as a group called AnyaNya, the predecessor to the SPLM movement 
(Rogier 2005:10).  
 
3.4 Independent country, internal matters 
 Sudan gained its independence 1 January 1956. The British government was hasty and 
did not want anything to do with what seemed to be rebellion in the South. Although the 
British administration always separated between north and south, they granted independence 
to the country as a whole with a temporary constitution that did not include any section 
regarding secularity or whether the nature of the state should be federal or unified (Johnson 
2003:9). After the transition of power, Arab nationalism spread throughout Sudan. The new 
regime started to implement policies according to an Islamic Arab state, which were to be 
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controlled through a centralized government in Khartoum. In 1958, General Ibrahim Abboud 
took power, and enforced a strong regime and increased the pressure on the South to join 
Islam and the Arab culture. For instance, education was changed from Christian in English to 
Muslim in Arabic (Abulemoi 2011:37).  
 An interesting remark when it comes to the international community regarding this 
conflict was the principle of state sovereignty. At this point in time, the principle that the 
international community could not intervene in a state’s internal matters were held high. 
Some years earlier, the United Nations (UN) was founded on this notion. In the UN Charter, 
article two, it is clearly stated that: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state…” (UN Charter 1945). Since Sudan was left as one state, the UN as well as the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) regarded the conflict as internal affairs of a member 
state, which would make an intervention illegitimate within international law at the time 
(Juma 2003:185). 
 
3.5 The Round Table Conference of 1965 
 More southerners started to join forces together with the former mutineers, and formed 
a political front called Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU), where the military branch 
was the AnyaNya (Rogier 2005:11). Civil war broke out in full scale, which resulted in 
General Abboud’s abdication, which was replaced with a civilian government and the 
initiative to the Round Table Conference of 1965 which was supposed to resolve the dispute 
(Abulemoi 2011:37).  
 The conference consisted of different parties from each side with various views on 
whether it was feasible or necessary to divide the country and on issues of federalized rule. 
Northern politicians wanted nothing more than to give away a limited amount of regional 
autonomy, while most Southerners wished for independence or some sort of federal 
government (Abulemoi 1011:38). Diverging interests, combined with a serious lack of trust 
between the parties resulted in a breakdown in talks. The North held elections, where the 
South was excluded in the voting. The Round Table Conference highlighted the distrust and 
differences between the two parts and fuelled the conflict until the end of the decade.  
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3.6 The Addis Ababa-agreement, an end to Sudan’s first civil war 
 A new leader took power over Sudan in January 1970. His name was Colonel Jaafar 
Nimeiry, and he conducted a new type of relationship with the South. First, he managed to 
broker deals with neighboring Ethiopia and Uganda, where they would seize to support each 
other’s rebel movement. Thereafter, he appointed a new Minister for Southern Affairs, Abel 
Alier, which would enjoy respect and trust from both sides in the conflict. This move would 
immediately ease the relationship between the two parts (Rogier 2005:13). Alier arranged 
secret meetings with southern leaders in exile, which proved to be fruitful and led to the 1972 
peace agreement between the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and the 
Government of Sudan (GOS), also called the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA), in this text 
also referred to as “the agreement".  
 Even though most southerners were fighting for the cause of independence, the 
agreement culminated in the creation of a semi-autonomous southern region with its own 
parliament and High Executive Council (HEC). Alier took the responsibility of leading the 
first regional government. The region would also experience an economic upturn, as the 
agreement allowed for local taxation in order to raise revenue, in addition to support from the 
central government. However, these money did not lead to much more autonomy for the 
Southerners, since the regional government was not permitted to decide upon own economic 
planning or social development (Johnson 2003:40). For the military, the agreement 
constituted a new national force called the ‘Southern Command’, whereas half the force was 
to be from the rebel movements in the region, and the other half from outside of the region, 
namely the government forces from the North. The aim was that the rebel armies would 
merge with northern armies, integrating them into one unit, causing the rebel army AnyaNya 
to lose its self-defense capacity (Rogier 2005: 14).  
 In the South the agreement didn’t bring security or much improvement politically, 
local representation was still very low amongst the important positions. Since the 1950s, the 
lack of local representation in the political system had been a central conflict in the South. 
Now that some administrative positions became available, the competition for these became 
fierce, seeing that it was the only job alternative for many people. The combination of such 
high demand for jobs and just a few available positions became problematic. The Provincial 
Government in 1972 was probably not only the smallest, but also the least educated 
administration in the world at the time; they had one employee per 11,227 persons and most 
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of these had been refugees or rebel fighters. For instance, the agricultural department had 14 
university graduates (Tvedt 1994:72). Insecurity and dissatisfaction grew as the rebel army 
became pacified within the Southern Command. Some AnyaNya fighters denounced the 
agreement, left the Southern Command and regrouped in the borderlands of Ethiopia where 
they continued their struggle (Abulemoi 2011:41).  
This agreement didn’t only spur concerns amongst the southern people, but other 
regions as well. Both Darfur and Kordofan wanted the same rights as the South. With that 
reasoning, groups from these areas attempted a coup d’état in 1975, but Nimeiry managed to 
prevail from the attack (Abulemoi 2011:41). From a northern point of view, the peace process 
was a failure; there were no other political entities that supported it except for Nimeiry. It 
actually weakened him to the point that he became isolated politically, and gained many 
enemies amongst the sectarian and Muslim fundamentalist parties. Nimeiry had to attempt a 
national reconciliation policy, in order to reconnect with the opposition parties. He invited 
exiled politicians, let some out from jail and appointed them in important positions in the 
army. This act secured Nimeiry in the government for a while, but it also marked the start of 
his downfall, when he let previous enemies close to the state institutions (Rogier 2005:15).  
 Along with the political descent of Nimeiry and the increase of radical Islam in 
government, the peace agreement was crumbling. In 1983, this latent discontent emerged into 
conflict when a battalion in the South started a mutiny after being ordered to the North. Two 
more battalions joined them, together with various rebel groups that had been fighting from 
the Ethiopian borders (Abulemoi 2011:41). The second civil war had started. 
 
3.6.1 Why did the Addis Ababa Agreement fail? 
 The breakdown of the Addis Ababa Agreement is not contributed to one factor alone. 
The processes that lead back to the fighting have many layers. This chapter aims to highlight 
some of these important factors that did lead the fighting to reemerge, thus undermining the 
agreement. Assessing the breakdown of this agreement can be helpful when looking forward 
to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, to pinpoint its shortcomings and strengths that may 
decide the future of the peace process. The Addis Ababa agreement was based on a 
compromise from both sides with a minimal and controllable share of autonomy given to the 
South. The CPA went further when it comes to autonomy; although this thesis will argue that 
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the deep rooted causes of the conflict may not disappear, between the North and the South, 
but also internally within the two parties.  
 It is important to remember that peace is not accomplished by an agreement in itself. 
The process of reconciliation amongst the society and its people, the leaders, amongst victims 
and offenders will always take time and it is not necessarily linear either, meaning that 
sometimes fights or other setbacks can reoccur. Structures in and between societies, and even 
culture can be decisive for the transition towards peace. In order to see the two peace 
agreements as two individual parts to one history, the conflict will be regarded within the 
framework of Complex Political Emergencies, whereas the definition of peace will be drawn 
from Johan Galtungs work.  
The concept of peace is fundamental when looking at peace agreements. Connotations 
to the word will vary greatly depending on who is using it and in what context. The word is 
difficult to define; it can seem like a light in the end of a tunnel, or a final goal. It is used 
much and there is seldom any coherence in what the concept actually means. In 1969, Johan 
Galtung attempted to break down this concept, in order for it to be of analytical interest 
(Galtung 1969:167). His work contributed to making peace more useful as an analytical tool, 
by creating a continuum between violence and peace, with different degrees and modes in 
between. First, he makes a distinction between personal violence and structural violence. The 
first can be understood as an “actual somatic realization” (Galtung 1969:174), which has to do 
with the body and different interactions in that regard; from the act of hitting someone in the 
face to using nuclear weapons. Such acts can again be distinguished from each other, in sub-
categories, for example if it is physical or psychological, intended or not intended. This type 
of violence is easier to perceive and be critical against, since there often is a clear victim and a 
perpetrator. The concept of structural violence can be more difficult to pinpoint, Galtung 
himself describes this as inequality in the distribution of power (Galtung 1969:175). Such 
inequalities can persist also after a peace agreement, keeping a different form of violence 
when the personal violence has stopped. The purpose of using Galtung’s definition on peace 
in this thesis is to look at the structures in society which the agreements did not change. As 
explained in this chapter, the agreement put an end to the fighting, but left a lot of the same 
problems unresolved.  
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3.6.2 Never a simple solution – Complex Political Emergencies 
 Galtung’s way of analyzing peace was one contribution to a more eclectic 
approach to research around the subject. Civil society, culture, institutions, socioeconomic 
factors and other aspects that don’t revolve around the actual warring actors should be seen as 
integral parts of a peace process.  Goodhand & Hulme (1999:16) use the term Complex 
Political Emergency (CPE) in order to acquire a broader understanding of a certain type of 
conflict. These kinds of conflicts can be recognized by the following features; emphasized 
with italic at the start of the next six sections: 
Conflict within and across state boundaries. Although the conflict between North- and 
South Sudan may appear to be a conventional civil war in the sense that there are two major 
actors with respective areas they control inside the country, the conflict has to be regarded as 
more complicated. The first reason for this is the ethnic composition of the country. As shown 
in appendix A, the southern part of Sudan is divided amongst many ethnic groups, including 
people of Arab descent or in other way associates themselves with the Arabic cultural 
heritage. There are many different tribes and beliefs spread out over the vast landscapes of 
Sudan, whereas some of these people are nomads wandering the land without any sense of 
administrative borderlines. In February 2010, the Misserya nomads entered the Unity region 
in the South which caused a clash with the South Sudanese army, killing 18 people. Although 
nomads have roamed these lands for many years, when moving over tense borderlines they 
can become a part of a larger conflict. Kuol Diuem Kuol, the spokesman from the Southern 
Sudanese army regarding this clash stated that “Our theory is that this will escalate and will 
be a big problem”, pointing out the potential threat such clashes mean for the peace process 
(Wheeler 2010).  A second reason for this argument is that the conflict is not isolated within 
the borders of Sudan. Influence and cooperation over borders play an integral role for both 
parties. While earlier in this paper, the close ties between AnyaNya and neighboring countries 
like Uganda and Ethiopia, there are more actors involved in this conflict, making it highly 
interconnected with other actors, states and conflicts in the region. The International Crisis 
Group (ICG 2010:1) claims that many of Sudan’s nine neighbors were “directly involved in, 
or affected by, it’s civil wars”. While Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia have been important 
supporters of the SPLA, Egypt has worked towards a unified Sudan, with the notion that the 
south is too fragile for independence. While action and diplomacy often are directed towards 
Sudan, the connections go both ways; in the 1960s President Nimeiry supported the Eritrean 
and Tigrayan fighters against Ethiopian government (ICG 2010:16). More recently, the 
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Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has entered South Sudan with unclear motives, plundering 
food from villages and burning houses, which is yet one more layer to the regional aspects 
and interconnectedness of this conflict.  
Political origins. When it comes to origins of Complex Political Emergencies,  
Goodhand & Hulme (1999:16) claims that “CPEs have political causality”. It can be difficult 
to isolate root causes or central dynamics in many conflicts, seeing that many factors tend to 
be interconnected, and motives may change over time. One example of this is the debate of 
whether greed or grievance is the most important motivation in some conflicts. It is legitimate 
to ask this question for Sudan as well; Switzer (2002:16) claims that “the conflict in the Sudan 
has been exacerbated by competing claims in regards to access to and control over the oil 
fields and the land areas they represent; and to the right to participate in decision making over 
oil rights allocations and share in the benefits of oil production”. However, Switzer does not 
take into account the long history of social conflict that played out long before oil fields were 
discovered. An analysis that narrows the causality of conflict only to this one factor will 
always be inadequate, although oil has become an important theme in Sudan now that it 
contributes for most of the income in the country. The concept of political origins can 
incorporate many factors and becomes almost analytically useless because it is hard to 
imagine a conflict where “changing or maintaining existing patterns of power” (Goodhand & 
Hulme 1999:16) is not a central dynamic, especially if competition over resources are taken 
into account as well. One central element in the conflict is that many people of South Sudan 
want to change the power constellation in order to create a sense of freedom from or equality 
with the North. This must be seen as a fundamental political aim.  
Protracted durations. The conflict in Sudan has been one of the longest most 
protracted conflicts on the African continent after the colonial era. Since 1955, there has only 
been eleven years of relative peace between the North and South. It cannot be regarded as 
some sort of crisis that once solved will cause a return to a normal level of violence in society. 
The length of the conflict can indicate at least two things; the causes of the conflict are deeply 
rooted in society, which will demand a comprehensive solution; and the conflict has probably 
created its own dynamic, whereas a war economy, -mentality and –politics permeates society. 
Collinson (2003:15) claims that “any society’s political economy will be transformed by, or 
in, conflict”, in other words, the way people think, act and make their living will be changed 
by a conflict, and especially when children grow up during conflict, it can take time for them 
to get used to a peaceful mindset and a peaceful society. In addition, leaders have also been 
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raised or come through a political system that is defined by war. The transition can be 
difficult, as seen in the period after the Addis Ababa Agreement, when the state 
administration was built on the dubious foundation of former fighters and too few experts, led 
by people loyal to Khartoum, as explained earlier. In essence, the society did not solve any of 
the differences or problems; the agreement merely achieved in halting the violence but failed 
in solving the conflict. 
Social cleavages are a most important factor with regard to the conflicts in Sudan. 
Every society has social cleavages to some extent and they appear in various forms, therefore 
it is essential to identify what the significant factors are in each society that separates people 
or creates the narrative of cleavage. Tsung-Tao Yang, the Deputy Director at the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury wrote that “Cleavages based on class or ethnicity can polarize a 
society, undermining opportunities for social cooperation and stimulating incentives for social 
conflict” (Yang 2003:3). In a peaceful society, different cleavages manifest themselves 
through political parties or interest organizations, which in a functioning democracy can be 
seen as healthy. An example of this can be when the working class unites through labor 
organizations or political parties in order to gain rights and privileges that they lack because 
of the cleavage between workers and owners and the skewed power relations in that regard. In 
Sudan as in most countries, many issues separate people, on a cultural, social and ethnical 
level. When looking at Sudan from a satellite picture, anyone can see with the naked eye how 
the nature has divided the country in two parts, the sandy desert in the north appear warm and 
desolate, while the South, starting at South Darfur, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile appear 
green and lush (see appendix B). While nature is not a social cleavage per se, the geography 
tends to create opportunities and advantages for the population. The most prominent example 
of this in modern times has been the location of the oil fields in Sudan, where most of the oil 
is located in the South bordering to the North, whereas the only way to transport oil is through 
the North from the Port of Sudan (see appendix C). Although a lot of focus is placed on oil 
when talking about this conflict, it is important to emphasize that it is only in the recent years 
that oil has been an important factor, but the conflict has been going on much longer. When 
compared to the Addis Ababa Agreement, this was not the most important issue at the time. 
The issues were more political than economical, autonomy in the south with sovereign 
political rule, freedom of religion and English rather than Arabic as the official language was 
key points in the agreement and its protocols (Shinn 2004:242). 
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The best way to describe Sudanese society as a whole is that it is diverse. Harir 
(1994:20) portrays Sudan as a good example of a plural society which is divided by 
‘segmental cleavages’. Such cleavages are fragments of societies that can create great 
differences between people; they can be religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, 
racial, ethnic etc. In some contexts, these segmental cleavages can be neutral or even 
unifying, but in other contexts, they can be exclusive and problematic. An example of this is 
the use of Arabic language in Sudan; in the North the use of Arabic in the formal educational 
system does not cause any disconcert. In Southern Sudan however, the use of Arabic as the 
lingua franca in national curriculum is problematic, seeing that there is no link to the Arab 
language or culture in these areas. In addition, the Arab language connotes a certain undertone 
of racial supremacy that go for back in history. In such cases, this fragment of culture creates 
frustration. The language example illustrates a core problem in the Sudanese society; the 
centralized government in Khartoum decides policy from the ‘top-down’, with no foundation 
in peoples will on the ground. This manifest itself in the social system; many different social 
groups and ethnicities work together under the umbrella of an authoritarian regime. Tvedt 
(1994:69) characterize the institutions in Sudan by “a lack of integration and complementarity 
between various parts of the social system”. With no common denominator in the society, no 
consensus of values, the society got fragmented into relatively independent sub-systems.  
Social cleavages and ethnicity is not the same, this is important to emphasize when 
analyzing this conflict in particular. While many observers rightfully point to the long history 
of Arabization in Sudan and the constructed dichotomy between those influenced by Arab 
culture and non-Arabs that was entrenched by the colonial administration (Sharkey 2008:21), 
and the social cleavages in the country follows this ethnic separation, there is a distinct 
difference with regards to identifying the root causes. Ethnicity in Sudan is a complex issue, 
which encompass a significant factor in explaining the dynamic in the conflict and is also 
intricately linked with the root causes. As Paglia (2007:15) explains, “the relative 
peacefulness of the previous centuries suggests that ethnic diversity does not constitute a 
major problem in Sudanese multi-ethnic societies. Ethnic diversity becomes conflict as a 
consequence of external factors”. Her argument is that other factors can have a negative 
impact on existing ethnic diversity, which is passive a priori. Economy, political competition, 
marginalization and inequality can become factors that generate a negative impact on the 
ethnic diversity that triggers frustration and separation between the respective ethnic groups. 
In turn, this can lead to increased support to parties or movements that draw their political or 
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ideological ideas from ethnical conflictual problems. This ethnicity becomes a ‘segmental 
cleavage’ which is construed from a society where social cleavages of many forms permeate 
social relations. This process of crystallization around revolutionary parties that use ethnicity 
or other segmental cleavages to gain support creates the notion of a ethnical conflict. In a 
post-conflict situation, it is important to recognize such trends, in order to assess whether they 
will wither after the conflict and create new internal conflicts in the power vacuum it might 
leave. In many cases, the same alignments tend to follow in the aftermath, much like the 
political scientists Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan discovered in the emergence of party 
systems after the democratic polities came to Europe; “traditional divisions had been ‘frozen’ 
in political terms and…. European party systems still reflected the structure of societal 
divisions which had existed…” (Kriesi 1998:165). In more recent history, this phenomenon 
can also be seen in South Africa, where the African National Congress (ANC) have retained 
power for 17 years after the apartheid era, where they were regarded as the liberating party by 
most of the public. In post-CPA Sudan, it is imperative that the new regime, especially in 
South Sudan deals with social cleavages. Both when it comes to creating a new unifying 
national identity, but also to even out economical differences. But it is also important that 
they let new political thoughts emerge and be able to gain power through democratic 
principles, despite the SPLM/A’s status as liberators.  
Predatory social formation is the last feature of a Complex Political Emergency. 
“CPEs are often ethno-nationalist in nature, characterized by a virulent loyalty to one 
particular social group, accompanied by equally strong feelings of antipathy towards other 
social groups living within the same state” (Crisp 1995:110). This quote describes the regime 
in Khartoum and the attitudes towards non-Arabs very well, given the attitudes from the 
strong central state at the Arab elite towards the poorer rural areas and their different beliefs, 
cultures and languages. During the 1990s, President al-Bashir declared that his regime in 
Khartoum was fighting for Sudan’s Arab-Islamic existence, and that the policies of Sharia law 
and the Arabic language were rooted in divine orders, and that the war against non-believers 
was to be considered as jihad, holy war (Lesch 1998:22). Of course, such processes are often 
a two-way street; as the project of ta’rib was manifesting itself as a racist, violent mission 
against every non-believer, carried out by well-armed Arabs that could kill with impunity 
(Sharkey 2008:39), the response was armed rebellion which grew strong in the outskirts, like 
Darfur and Southern Sudan, that had access to military aid from their allies. John Garang got 
very popular by demanding a new Sudan based on an African ideological foundation, not 
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Arab. These thoughts resonated in various regions and in one instance inspired Darfurian 
rebels of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) to commence an attack on the government 
garrisons in El Fashir 2003 (Sharkey 2008:38).  
Cultural dominance through violence is not the only thing that characterizes a 
predatory state. Lundahl (1997:48) describes a significant feature of the predatory state 
through its rent creation; it has economical mechanisms that “use resources to redistribute 
income and wealth without creating any goods or services that are demanded by the general 
citizen”. Is such an economy, resources are not allocated as they should be, and this may 
cause unproductive activities to drive productive ones out, causing economic regression. 
According to Siddig, El-Harizi and Prato (2007:48) Khartoum has displayed a massive 
interest in exerting ownership over all land not registered as property in Sudan; although they 
present it as necessary for state building in a post-colonial period, this assertion has been 
refuted on the grounds that it enabled the Arab elites to undertake predatory actions linked to 
these land resources by distributing them as political rewards to their clients, thus creating a 
patron-client structure founded in land areas that should be distributed according to public 
will in a democratic society. For many African states, such clientilist structures have been 
implemented instead of institutional or legislative strategies. Such systems are often 
dependent on an ethnic majority in the country that supports one party or president. For 
Sudan, the regime in Khartoum wins politically by representing the Arab ‘superiority’ and 
marginalizing the others. If opposing politicians or parties want to have any ambitions of 
power or wealth in such a system, the best tactic is to align or strike deals with the majority 
regime and not to create opposition coalitions. According to van de Walle (2003:314), the 
problem with the clientilist structure is that parties do not serve to preserve interests of the 
people, but they rather serve to maintain a certain representation function “in a context of 
clientilistic politics that are dominated by a disproportionately powerful executive and are 
only imperfectly democratic”. When taken into account, the structure of the regime in 
Khartoum and the aggression towards ‘the others’, it is obvious that state structure has been 
an important factor in the conflict.  
This problematic is not exclusive to the Khartoum regime either; as mentioned above, 
the SPLM/A gained much support on being the strong opposition to the North, and being the 
liberating movement for South Sudan. However, there is a political opposition in the South 
that has been excluded in the CPA and marginalized as opponents in the emerging political 
landscape. Resentment in this group of opposition can be a dangerous element in the post-
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secession state building process; on the one hand the political opposition had the crucial task 
of controlling the political process and to create a feasibly political option for the people of 
Sudan. On the other hand, too much resentment and acting through wrong channels could 
prove detrimental; the International Crisis Group (2011a:5) reported of post-election 
rebellions in Sudan, whereas the SPLM/A fell back on what it knew best in times of crisis, 
namely military administration. In order to manage the diverse, secular state that was the 
initial aim, a more nuanced approach is needed.  
Opposition in South Sudan is weak; there are no good infrastructure in the country and 
few resources that can support national political campaigns. Party bases are scattered, or 
limited to specific regions or ethnic segments (ICG 2011a:16). This foundation does not 
provide for a good political climate, and if not real political competition is established early, 
the young country can fall into a mono-political culture that was initially the enemy. Albeit 
the difficult political climate for healthy opposition, some progress is being done that can 
provide some hope; the Sudan Tribune (2011) can report of a gathered opposition, consisting 
of 18 leaders from various parties, meeting to find a common ground for a coalition that can 
challenge SPLM in the future. It remains to be seen what kind of political alignments the 
parties will unite around.  
 
3.6.3 The continuity of the conflict as a Complex Political Emergency 
 When understanding conflict as more than just violence, it is possible to identify 
causes that are structural and built into the society. This chapter has discussed some of these 
structural factors to the conflict, with the aim of creating a more eclectic approach than 
focusing only on one segment of the conflict, like greed or grievance. Goodhand and Hulme 
(1999:18) support this approach to analyzing conflict, whereas it differs from the traditional 
notion of a beginning and an end to conflicts. A conflict should rather be viewed as a social 
process that reshapes original structural tensions by massive disruptions. With this 
perspective, one can view the Sudanese conflict as a whole, and trace how structures changed 
and the dynamics of conflict changes over time. The second aim is to draw the lines from the 
failure of the Addis Ababa agreement to the process of the CPA and assess what the potential 
issues can be for a regression in the peace process. Instead of looking at the secession as the 
end of the conflict, rather watch it in light of the previous process, and discuss how this 
changed the process and what kind of challenges that is not solved by it, and if new 
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challenges have the potential to arise after the secession. As this chapter highlighted some of 
the core structural issues that have separated the people and caused frustration and resentment 
between social groups in Sudan, the following chapters will discuss which of these core issues 
are going to remain contentious if not resolved properly, despite a cease fire and despite 
secession.  
One important source of conflict in Sudan has been the unequal access to both 
economic revenue and the political system, as explained earlier. These are grievances that will 
not disappear because of a cease fire, but through secession these will have the potential to 
change into a new dynamic. Throughout chapter three and four, the effects of secession versus 
power sharing, and the effects of a new political and economic regime will be discussed. With 
regards to the difference in the process after the Addis Ababa agreement and after the CPA, 
the new challenges will be to create well-functioning structures for redistribution of revenue 
and access to the political regime, in the South. In the North, there are numerous challenges 
regarding the minorities that are non-Arab, will these gain access to the northern political 
regime? The CPA may have created a more difficult situation for these minorities, in the 
sense that the proportions of Arab ethnicity has increased following the secession. Before the 
agreement, this marginalization with the racial and religious discrimination was major factors 
in the process that lead to war. For many people, especially in the North, this marginalization 
will continue; areas where this may be a problem is located in the border- and rural areas on 
the southern and western rims of North Sudan. These areas, like the Nuba Mountains in 
Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile state will be discussed further in chapter four.  
Along the vast border areas are also most of the existing oil fields situated. During the 
late 1970s, oil was discovered in Southern Sudan and the economy in Sudan was on decline. 
President Nimeiri wanted to seize the future oil revenue in order to secure the financial 
survival of his regime. In order to achieve this, a bill was passed that distorted the provincial 
boundaries so that the oil region and areas rich of other minerals became a part of the North 
(Badal 1986:144). According to Ylönen (2005:121), the unfair claim to this land was an 
important reason why fighting broke out shortly after. This is an interesting example when 
comparing to present issues that need to be resolved. Since the area of Abyei had been so 
fiercely disputed from both sides, the situation can resemble the one in the 1970s; one area 
that contains valuable resources, which are majorly important for both parts, no agreement on 
how to share this. In such delicate situations, small incidents have the potential to escalate 
into larger revolts.  
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Another area that is going to be affected by the peace process between North- and 
South Sudan is the western area of Darfur. Without going in depth of the isolated problematic 
of that region, it can still be reviewed in the light of the North/South peace process. The war 
in Darfur broke out in 2003, one year after the signing of the Machakos Protocol. Although 
some wanted the Darfur conflict to be included in the CPA negotiations, it would have made 
the process a whole lot more difficult. The opposing voices claimed that the conflict in Darfur 
was very different than the North/South, and that it didn’t belong in the same agreement 
(Abulemoi 2011:46). However, the conflicts don’t differ significantly from each other; the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the SLM/A fought in Darfur against what they 
perceived as oppression of non-Arabs. John Ashworth, an advisor on Sudan issues with ties to 
Christian organizations commented to the Sudan Tribune that the peace agreement would 
make it more difficult for Christians and other non-Muslims living in the North, especially in 
Darfur, who would now become further marginalized (Uma 2011). This is an important issue 
which will be further discussed in chapter four.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 This chapter has given a descriptive analysis of the historical context to the conflict 
and the divisions in contemporary Sudan. How the Arab influence in the north affected those 
societies, but further west and south, other beliefs and cultures prevailed. During the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium Sudan was framed within one state structure that favored the Arab 
elite, thus creating and enforcing an ethnically based hierarchy. Although constructed, this 
notion of superiority in the North conflicts with the marginalized people and created a 
division in Sudan where people are opposed to the state on the grounds of their cultural, 
religious and ethnic heritage. When the central elite in Khartoum decided to campaign with 
violent means in order to ‘Arabize’ the country, the opposition became more violent as well, 
this resulted in the Civil war of 1955. Of course, with this narrow historic perspective, it is 
important to emphasize that social problems in Sudan reached further than just ethnic 
divisions; a centralized predatory state, poverty in the rural areas were also important factors.  
 Such factors become more evident when looking at the sources of failure for the Addis 
Ababa Agreement of 1972. As Tvedt (1994:72) points out, there were serious structural 
problems that were caused by scarce resources, massive lack of competent labor for important 
positions and a general lack of funding. In addition to this, the extreme lack of autonomy in 
Stellenbosch Univeristy  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
46 
 
the region after a dispersed army and an influx of Northern representatives in important 
positions created resentment with the people of the South, which shortly became a recruitment 
haven for the newly constituted SPLA.  
 Through using the framework that was provided in this chapter in order to assess many 
societal and structural sources of conflict, a more complex explanation was reached. In 
addition to assessing important flaws in the the agreement and its implementation, the 
overarching aim is to illustrate how the sources of conflict can prevail despite of a cease fire 
or even a peace agreement. This way of looking at conflict is important for the following 
chapters; when assessing the sources of conflict in comparison to power sharing- and 
secession theory, one can identify what aspects of the conflict that will continue to prevail and 
if any new problems can emerge through such a process. Further on, this is also an important 
intellectual foundation when assessing the CPA with regards to sources of conflict.  
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Chapter 4: The Comprehensive Peace Agreement – How secession was 
achieved and why the conflict is not over 
 
4.1 Introduction – The significance of a new international climate  
 To work towards peace is a process that will take time, and should be done 
thoroughly. As argued in chapter two, the Addis Ababa Agreement was a relatively rapid 
process with little foundation in a serious desire to solve divisions deeply rooted in the 
Sudanese society. Violence reemerged and the failed peace process constituted the 
continuation of Africa’s longest civil war. With this experience still in mind, the second 
attempt at a peace process was formally initiated on 6 December 2003 in Naivasha, Kenya. 
This effort was the result of almost 10 years of dialogue between the regime in the North and 
the SPLM/A, initiated by IGAD in 1994 with support from the Ethiopian Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi and the Eritrean President Asaias Afewerki (Ahmad 2010:7).  
The time that was invested in these negotiations and the sober realization that the 
process would need to span over many years may have reflected a serious aspiration to reach 
a peaceful solution from both parts. SPLM/As leadership had learned some important lessons 
from the agreement in 1972 which reflected in their thorough and time consuming approach 
to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Why the parties found the time ripe for 
negotiations is still debatable; some say that the will to meet at the negotiation table was 
spurred by outside pressure. Emeric Rogier, a senior analyst for the Clingendael research 
institute and the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) claims that 
the terrorist attacks that hit the United States (US) 11 September 2001 “dramatically impacted 
on the bilateral relationship between the US administration and the GoS, thereby creating the 
environment in which a new international peace effort saw the light” (Rogier 2005a:45). 
Shortly after 11 September 2001, Khartoum claimed their support in the war against terrorism 
in order to gain vital support from the US and not to become identified as a target for the 
American retribution either. As a result of this shift in policy in Khartoum, the handling of the 
southern question was going to need a different approach (Rogier 2005a:54). At the other side 
of the border, SPLM renewed their strength, after Sudan People’s Defense Force (SPDF) 
signed a reconciliation agreement and joined forces with them, causing an end to a ten year 
long dispute between the Dinka- and the Nuer people. In addition, the SPLM merged forces 
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with a group of northern Muslim Sudanese Allied Forces, making the movement a serious 
threat to the Northern regime.  
 Given that the US was so influential in the process of changing the climate of  politics 
in Sudan, it is interesting to note that US President Bush appointed a new Special Envoy for 
Peace in the Sudan, Senator Danforth (Rogier 2005a:57). The new special envoy started out 
by testing the waters; he wanted to know how susceptible the parties really were to 
commitment and cooperation. After all, there have been many agreements in the Sudan 
throughout history, but not a history of keeping any agreements. As Danforth himself said: 
“The history of Sudan is littered with dozens of proposals and agreements to end the fighting. 
These agreements all have one thing in common: none was implemented, and none brought 
Sudan closer to peace” (Danforth 2002:4). In order to learn more about their willingness to 
cooperate, the special envoy carried out four tests with humanitarian aims where he demanded 
concrete action from both parties. Three of the tests had various ways of cease fire or military 
stand down as aims, whereas the last one related to the slavery issue. In especially the last 
one, a relative success could be measured when Khartoum brought this issue under direct 
control of the President and allowed foreign instances of control (Danforth 2002:16). 
Although this effort contributed to some humanitarian reliefs, it was not ground breaking nor 
even wise. Critics point to the potential of failure on such tests, which could be detrimental in 
effect. In addition, it takes away focus from the fundamental issues (Rogier 2005a:59). What 
is interesting however is the fact that both parties in the conflict actually did show the signs of 
ripeness that Senator Danforth was hoping for. This may stem from many reasons, but it is not 
unlikely, that the increased international pressure made the option of compromise more 
appealing.  
Under the circumstances, one viable option for the Americans could be to make an 
attempt to take matters into their own hands. After acknowledging willingness from both 
parties, this was within reach. However, the Special Envoy focused on listening to various 
stakeholders and important actors, like President Moi and President Mubarak. Seeing that 
there were so many peace initiatives at the time, he focused on consolidation and 
encouragement, rather than undermining the current initiatives. Through years of dialogue 
and compromise, this eclectic approach culminated in an agreement that would be the 
underlying platform on the progress towards peace. 
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 The seminal moment for this agreement found place on 9 January 2005 when the 
document was signed by both parties. A new state model was to be implemented, which 
according to the Chairman of the SPLM at the time, John Garang de Mabior, was “a unique 
peace agreement that, in effect, prescribed a one-country-two-systems model” (UN Security 
Council 2005). The agreement did also reflect a certain understanding that the process would 
have to integrate many aspects of society which respectively needed a sizeable time frame to 
implement. Six years were reserved for implementing the CPA, where in the end the South 
would have the option to vote if they wanted to continue with the two-system model, or to 
secede from the North as an independent state which would be decided by a referendum (UN 
Security Council 2005). In February 2011, it was apparent that South Sudan chose 
independence, when the votes from the referendum were counted and 98.83 per cent opted for 
secession (Kron 2011).   
 The aim of this chapter is to continue the analysis of the peace process with a focus on 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The structure will follow the chapters in the agreement 
in order to assess; the most integral part of the conflict; the peace process; and the 
negotiations that lead to it. Throughout this process, the experiences from the Addis Ababa 
agreement will be used for comparison in order to illuminate certain similarities that haven’t 
been improved or other pitfalls. On that note it is important to emphasize that there are 
significant differences in the two parts of the process; different actors; local innovation such 
as the discovery of oil; changes in the international norms when it comes to intervention; in 
addition there has lately been changes in the regional constellations during the ‘Arab spring’, 
whereas Egypt has gained new leadership. As for this study, the aim is to perceive the conflict 
as a whole, based on the thought that a conflict is not necessarily confined by borders or 
agreements - complex root causes like sociopolitical relations, economy, poverty, a history of 
conflict, geopolitical power struggles  is what will decide how the process goes. In order to 
convey this, one has to assess many aspects of the conflict and pinpoint the ones that are most 
liable to fuse the conflict together despite the secession. Many examples can be drawn from 
this chapter, like the geopolitics of oil, the solution of the Abyei, Southern Kordofan and the 
Blue Nile State. The argument of this study is that it would be misconstrued to describe Sudan 
and South Sudan as a success story based solely on the secession. This chapter aims to 
illustrate this. 
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4.2 Establishing the peace agreement – the Machakos Protocol 
 241 pages constitute the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed by His Excellence 
Ali Osman Mohamed Taha as the representative for the Government of the Republic of the 
Sudan, and Dr. John Garang de Mabior as the representative for the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (CPA 2005). It is also signed by 14 witnesses, representatives for 
organizations or countries involved in the peace process. This document is the foundation that 
political process and public debate will revolve around for many more years. It defines how 
power and wealth will be structured, and how the society will appear in the post-conflict era. 
This section will outline each of the five chapters in the CPA and address some of the main 
implications of each chapter as the foundation for a multi-disciplinary theoretical analysis that 
will follow.  
Chapter I is called ‘The Machakos Protocol’, named after its place of origin and it was 
the result of the long peace talks beforehand. Ahmad (2010:7) describes it as the “backbone” 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The protocol is divided in three categories; ‘Agreed 
Principles’; ‘The Transition Process’ and; ‘Structures of Government’. The structure seems 
logically to transform abstract principles down to a pragmatic level. An example of this is 
how the principle of rights to govern affairs in own regions is followed up with a structure to 
ensure this in the government. As a “backbone” its principles regarding individual human 
beings would resemble the more progressive constitutions in the world, based on human 
rights and equality for all. Furthermore, it serves very much like a vision for the continuation 
of the peace talks, that a democratic system of governance shall be established, where 
cultural, ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic diversity is taken into account. Whereas much 
of these principles resemble conspicuously what anyone would expect the external agents 
from the West to formulate, there is one vision principle that is worth emphasizing: “Design 
and implement the Peace Agreement so as to make the unity of the Sudan an attractive option 
especially to the people of South Sudan” (CPA 2005:2). Despite popular opinion in South 
Sudan, Dr. John Garang de Mabior envisioned a unified Sudan. During all the twenty years of 
fighting against the regime in the North, he consistently stuck to this conviction that the North 
and the South could unite and live in coexistence. His vision was that the “New Sudan” was 
not going to be an Islamist state, but a democratic inclusive state for all races, tribes and 
religions, and the structure of the state would resemble much like how it was in the pre-
referendum period (Collins 2005). It is interesting that Garang’s vision would be popular on 
any side of the conflict, since he was opposed to secession and at the same time didn’t want 
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an Islamic state. Despite this contradiction in terms, he managed to gain much popularity and 
respect both at home and in the North; he was actually met with a large cheering crowd when 
he visited the Green Square (Sahah Khadrah) in 2005 (Ahmad 2010:8). Considering the 
respect that Garang had gained on both sides, the peace process became unstable when the 30 
July 2005 he was killed in a helicopter crash, after leading SPLM/A for 21 years (ICG 
2005:1). In retrospect, the fact that the peace process continued in the same tracks under the 
leadership of the secessionist Salva Kiir in the time after proved that it was not dependent on 
just one man, which should be regarded as a positive sign and give added legitimacy to the 
process. It is however, important to point out what experts like Robert O. Collins at the 
University of California argues; that Garang’s death resulted in an increased support for 
Southern separatists (Pan 2005). 
 
4.2.1 The transition process – establishing rules for the interim period 
Furthermore, the protocol dealt with the transition process. This is what would bind 
the ambitious principles to the reality on the ground. This process would be executed in two 
different sequences; first a pre-interim period of six months, then; an interim period of six 
years. In the first period, the hostilities should cease, together with the establishment of 
institutions and mechanisms that could support the new regime. The second period would be 
the active implementation of everything that has been established in the first period. It is also 
noted that everyone is eligible for public office and presidency, regardless of their beliefs 
(CPA 2005:5). During this interim period it was crucial that the ceasefire would be upheld, in 
order to create space for the two parties to implement the peace agreement with as much 
success as possible. To ensure this arrangement, a multi-layered structure was used to monitor 
the ceasefire and to confirm that all forces were re-deployed to agreed areas. The two main 
bodies in this structure is; the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) a military decision 
making body that is located in Juba, chaired by the UN Force Commander and his staff; the 
other is the Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) which is a political decision making body 
composed of senior political, military and legal party representatives, the Deputy Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General and observers from IGAD (Rogier 2005b:27). 
However, despite much high ranking international personnel present, there was no mechanism 
to involve the UN or the international community in case of violations, which in essence 
meant that the two parties would act as their own judges and enforce matters single-handedly. 
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Most of the CPA separate between during and after the interim period; this is often a 
compromise, whereas the referendum will decide whether to continue with the structures 
established in the interim period, or to secede and create separate systems individually. The 
third and last part of the Machakos Protocol regards the ’Structures of Government’. This 
describes how the government and judicial system will function during the interim period. An 
emphasis is placed on the constitution as supreme law, this constitution guarantee freedom of 
belief, worship and religious practice to all of the Sudanese people. One of the main 
compromises in the protocol is the agreement on Sharia laws; the SPLA accepted such 
legislation in the North, but it is stated that they need to have consensus of the people and that 
it only shall have effect outside of Southern Sudan (Rogier 2005a:65). The question of 
independence for South Sudan is also addressed in this part of the agreement, where it is 
stated that “At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an internationally 
monitored referendum … for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by 
voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote 
for secession” (CPA 2005:8). Such is the end of the Machakos Protocol, a compromise it is 
difficult to understand that the North would agree to. As argued earlier, the context is 
imperative to understand what kind of pressure was needed in order to consent to this 
compromise; a committed US on the search for relatively unidentified culprits within 
worldwide Muslim networks, and; a strong South Sudan, with a leader that worked for a 
united Sudan.  
 
4.3 Restructuring of power – governance and institutions 
Chapter II regards ‘Power Sharing’, a subject has been discussed in the previous 
chapter. The mechanism of sharing power is in the agreement well planned. The GoS pledge 
to protect and promote the national sovereignty and the welfare of its people, while the 
Southern Sudan level of Government are to exercise authority in respect of the people and 
States in the South. (CPA 2005:12). As noted earlier, the principles behind the new state 
resemble the UN Universal Declaration of Human rights. They include the right to life, 
personal liberty, freedom of religion, expression, assembly, right to vote and equality before 
the law. There is one relative upside of drafting such important documents in these days rather 
than hundred years ago. It has the potential to be more progressive than the more established 
Stellenbosch Univeristy  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
 
states. One example of this is the South African constitution that came into effect in 1997 
which often is referred to as the most progressive constitution in the world (Marshall 2011). 
A special remark regarding the principles is number 1.6.2.3 Slavery, this principle 
state that “No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave trade in all their forms shall 
be prohibited”. The GoS have earlier been linked to the Murahaleen, a militia from western 
Sudan, which raid villages and abduct civilians to use for slave labor. The accusations have 
been that they arm such militias and use them as some sort of proxy forces (Rogier 2005a:58). 
As noted earlier in this paper, US Special Envoy and Senator Danforth attempted to test the 
two parties will to cooperate by asking them to carry out various requests that would be 
difficult with regard to internal politics on both sides, whereas one of the requests was that 
Khartoum would strengthen its anti-slavery commission, plus facilitate a US-led mission of 
eight investigators that could pursue charges of slavery (Danforth 2002:16). Danforth 
concluded positively with regards to this special test, after it was carried out and the President 
brought the anti-slavery commission directly under his control (Rogier 2005a:61). In 
retrospect, there is still a lot to be done in the Sudanese society when it comes to abolishing 
slavery. Christian Solidarity International reported of many instances of slaves being 
mistreated as late as 2010 (CSI 2010). Obviously, this is a difficult aim to achieve in such a 
large, diverse and impassable country; the span from written words and agreements to a 
change in actions and attitudes has been large in Sudan.  
 
4.3.1 Problems regarding the implementation of institutions  
“It is easier to fight for one’s principles than to live up to them”, Alfred Adler once 
said. This might not always be true, but in the case of implementing a peace agreement, it 
pinpoints the most difficult obstacle: Applying the agreed terms to a war torn society. In order 
to transfer the agreed principles to everyday politics, one needs tangible step-by-step goals. 
The second part of Chapter II addresses this issue by mapping out the technical composition 
of the institutions that are going to exercise power. An interim government was established by 
the mandate of Chapter II, whereas the NCP would control 52 percent and the SPLM 28 
percent, the rest would be divided amongst other parties from both sides. This constellation 
was named the Government of National Unity (GNU). As a structure, it was supposed to 
reflect real power relations in the country, but as a government the aim was to provide power 
sharing between the North and the South, and additionally spread participation throughout the 
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country, to the far regions. On the one hand, this experiment could result in too much power 
taken away from Khartoum, causing the regime to withdraw their efforts and regress the 
peace process. On the other hand, Khartoum could end up with too much hold of the South, 
causing rebellion amongst its citizens, much like how the ceasefire of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement ended.  
Despite an admirable effort to establish the GNU, there seemed to be little 
transformation of the Sudanese political, social and economic reality; according to reports 
from the International Crisis Group (ICG), the power in Sudan has only become more 
centralized in Khartoum and around President al-Bashir (ICG 2011b:i). In 2009, the Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) urged the GNU to take action, as the violence around the border areas 
seemed to increase; the fear was that these fights that took place around the border areas 
would compromise the Joint Integrated Units (JIU), which is a composition military branch, 
consisting of soldiers from both sides (Gagnon 2011). Two years later, in June 2011, The 
New York Times could report that the situation was far from stable. Clashes in Southern 
Kordofan between northern military forces and southern allied forces caused tens of 
thousands of people to migrate (Kron & Gettleman 2011). Violence in these disputable border 
areas can contribute to instability and worsen the relations between the two parts. But another 
dimension to this conflict serves as a serious problem: Internal fighting. Between January and 
the end of June 2011, there were reports of almost 2400 people dead because of cattle raids 
and other internal South Sudan clashes (Farkas 2011).  
Failure to establish credible democratic institutions with real ties to the local 
communities was in the last chapter mentioned as one of the important factors that weakened 
the peace process. In this regard, there are good reasons for looking at the emerging political 
regime in South Sudan, what kind of legitimacy they will have at the local level and how the 
state institutions will be formed in order to support the people. Although tangible results on 
this field have to take time to develop, the political leaders of South Sudan delivers promises; 
the people will gain access to state services, the state will deal with corruption and insecurity 
issues (Jok 2011:2). As for the post-election situation in South Sudan, the government is not 
capable of protecting its own civilian population, which is one of the basic functions of a state 
(Breidlid & Sande Lie 2011:11). This task has been left to international actors, which is not a 
sustainable practice. With a budget of USD 2 billion, the new government will have to strive 
in order to reach any of the ambitious goals for development (Jok 2011:12). Not any sector in 
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the government can be fully equipped to meet its challenges with that kind of financing; 
hence making foreign independence a big issue in the time to come.  
Institution building will generate some big important government bodies, but also 
many minor and temporary ones. It is important for all stake holders to ensure that the first 
steps of a new nation is in the right direction. Some of the other independent or national 
institutions that were created through Chapter II  was; a national electoral commission, a 
human rights commission; a civil service commission; an ad-hoc commission for monitoring 
the referendum, and; a fiscal and financial allocation and monitoring commission (CPA 
2005:27). These institutions will build the framework for South Sudan, and will participate in 
deciding what kind of future that will come to be. It is important that they will gain legitimacy 
through their own work and a solid foundation in the various local communities throughout 
the country. 
Previous experience with power sharing through the Addis Ababa Agreement was not 
successful, although the basic institutional framework was there. An important difference in 
the CPA is the level of autonomy given to the south. Through Chapter II, Part III, a 
Government of Southern Sudan is constituted, in order to administer the constitution that was 
yet to be drafted. Instead of having representatives from Khartoum occupying the most 
important positions, the SPLM now would have 70 percent majority in the interim 
government of Southern Sudan. This assembly was to govern prior to the election, NCP had 
15 percent of the representatives, and other Southern political forces possessed the remaining 
15 percent. Relations within the Southern political landscape were difficult because of the 
dominance SPLM gained through the peace process. In addition to shortage of funding, the 
lack of political eclecticism was one of the major points of critique to the IGAD initiative 
(Apuuli 2011:353).  Other parties were sidelined in the entire process, which culminated 
when drafting the constitution in March 2011. Representatives from other political parties 
chose to pull out from the technical committee because they were constantly undermined by 
SPLM (SSNA 2011). In assessment, the level of democracy is integral in this process, and 
even though the government in Khartoum have less direct influence in the new power 
structure, it does not automatically mean that the process is very democratic. Internal 
instability can be very detrimental for South Sudan in the future. Abulemoi (2011:89) argues 
that proportional representation would contribute positively to the process, instead of 
marginalizing minor parties and armed groups, forcing them to still using violence in order to 
protect their interests. 
Stellenbosch Univeristy  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
56 
 
4.4 Sharing of wealth – a contentious issue 
Chapter III of the CPA regards the founding principles for sharing of wealth amongst 
North and South. The division of resources and the redistribution of revenue are issues that in 
themselves have an enormous potential for conflict. Therefore, it is important to emphasize 
that the argument throughout this thesis suggest that any form of explanation based solely on 
resources or aspects of greed will at best be too narrow. The conflict dates back before any oil 
or other valuable resources would be worth fighting over; explanations of root causes should 
historically be based on marginalization and abuse of power by the elites. With that as the 
underlying assumption, other factors of conflict can be linked causally back. Religion and 
ethnicity is one example that became more important as the ruling elite used such divisions 
actively in their hierarchy of society. Control of wealth is also a type of conflict that derives 
from the root causes and can take on its own dynamic within the whole process. The role of 
oil for example has become an important issue in later years, because the Sudanese economy 
has become more and more dependent on revenue from oil (Gadkarim 2010:7), making it a 
more important issue. As D’Agoot (2009:119) points out, the issue of oil in Sudan has always 
been a contentious problem; the exploration and occupation of oilfields have become 
increasingly important for the Khartoum government in order to find new sources of revenue. 
On the other hand, the South has perceived oil exploitation as an act of plunder. This lead to 
military attacks from the South dating back to the 70s. The same dynamic was obvious the 
first year after the secession, when the Southern army moved into the Heglig oil field, which 
is located in the disputed border areas. This move resulted in long lasting attacks from the 
Northern army, accompanied with air strikes (Holland & Maasho 2012). Although oil sharing 
is an important part of the conflict resolution, this section will also discuss other financial 
aspects to wealth sharing, which can be equally important, like redistribution policy and 
currency. 
Reaching an agreement on wealth sharing was a troublesome process. In late 2002, the 
discussion focused on land ownership and revenue, and the difference amongst the two sides 
was incompatible; the SPLM interpreted the Machakos protocol as the foundation for a 
confederate structure where the South gained greater autonomy, whereas Khartoum still 
regarded the control of wealth as to be remained centrally (Abulemoi 2011:126). The 
mediation remained fruitless until May 2003, at that time there were still no agreement on the 
sharing of wealth or power and there were no agreement on where the areas of Abyei, Nuba 
Mountains and Blue Nile should belong to. At this point, Mediators from IGAD changed their 
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tactic; instead of dealing with individual issues the mediators chose to discuss all the 
outstanding issues at once, which opened up for making compromises across the main issues 
(ICG 2002:2). This approach was manifested by the Nakuru Protocol, a suggestion from the 
mediators on what they regarded as fair compromises. Basically, it was a document 
containing the most contentious issues, presented from an external angle (Reliefweb 2003). 
This was not received well from the northern representatives, which disagreed strongly to 
issues regarding power-sharing, security and wealth sharing. President al-Bashir rejected it 
flat out, and the peace process seemed to come to an abrupt end (Justice Africa 2003).  
Recovering from the Nakuru breakdown was difficult for the mediators, but after hard 
work, they got the parties to join together again, this time with General Sumbeiywo from 
Kenya as the chairman. This new approach had a better dynamic, whereas the parties gained 
more flexibility when it came to the process itself, setting the agenda and finding their own 
compromise (ICG 2002:1). The SPLM put forward their own approach to sharing wealth, 
which contained many elements of physical separation; separate central banks and separate 
currencies. These suggestions were met by Vice-President of Sudan Ali Osman Taha with 
distress. But through discussions, he and John Garang reached an agreement on monetary 
policy, central bank, currency and land rights. Within short time, they managed to resolve 
many intricate issues, including the sharing of oil revenues. On 7 January 2004, the progress 
was concluded with the parties’ signatures on the Agreement on Wealth Sharing (CPA 
2005:45). 
 
4.4.1 The wealth sharing agreement – financial aspects 
This agreement begins with guiding principles for the sharing of common wealth, 
which can be read as a foundation for the mediation, but also as an acknowledgment of many 
problems that especially Southern Sudan are facing. It states that “The sharing and allocation 
of this wealth shall be based on the premise that all parts of Sudan are entitled to 
development” (CPA 2005:47), and continues to recognize that the South have more dire needs 
when it comes to the performance of basic government functions, civil administration and 
reconstruction of the social and physical infrastructure after the conflict. Further on, in section 
1.8, it goes as far as accept that the sharing of revenue is actually going to reflect a process of 
power devolution, with decentralization of power as an aim (CPA 2005:47). Such admittance 
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from the Northern regime has to be regarded as a big concession for them, but also a step 
towards a more democratic Sudan.  
In essence, the agreement on wealth sharing provided a new method of structuring the 
redistribution of revenue. All revenue collected nationally would be collected in the National 
Revenue Fund (NRF), which would be administered by the National Treasury (CPA 
2005:56). From there, funds would be allocated to the proper recipients according to the 
agreement. This process would also be transparent and open to the public, but to ensure this 
properly, the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC) was 
constituted. This commission was to be composed of representatives from all states and 
regions of Sudan, together with representatives from the GoS and the GoSS (CPA 2005:57).  
Although transparency and proper allocation of wealth certainly are positive features 
of the CPA, one aspect of this agreement is of particular gravity; the new banking system and 
currency. As mentioned earlier, this issue has been highly disputed in the negotiations. The 
reason behind this can be traced back to the Addis Ababa Agreement. Another lack in that 
process revealed itself in the aftermath, when southern Sudan found itself increasingly 
deprived of funding, caused by diminutive commercial activity in the area. This was not 
surprising, bearing in mind that the north controlled all the commercial agreements 
(Abulemoi 2011:128). During the Machakos talks, the southern representatives required a 
different approach, and ended up with a solution that would favor two separate economies; a 
dual banking system supported by two currencies. Like that, the North was able to keep the 
Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) which was based on an Islamic banking system, whereas the 
south established the Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS) which was based on a Western 
banking system (CPA 2005:59). This would ensure the basis of a more independent economy 
in Southern Sudan. To the ordinary Sudanese person, this would be visible through the dual 
currency system as well, where the North would use the Sudanese dinar, while the South 
would start using the Sudanese pound (Jooma 2005:13). The purpose of the new currency was 
to reflect the cultural diversity of Sudan. Since implementing this would take time, the two 
currencies would circulate in parallel until the pound would be properly incorporated in the 
money flow. Of course, this would not only serve as a signal effect, but also provide 
autonomy and greater security for the South.  
For the Sudanese in the South, this will have a practical and a symbolic effect, which 
might prove to be very important with regards to autonomy. However, there are some 
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premises that must be met. The CPA ensures that the CBOS will have the mandate to carry 
out monetary policies according to “market-based instruments instead of administrative 
allocation of credit” (CPA 2005:59). This paragraph is meant to protect the economy from 
unnecessary political meddling. In post-conflict situations when democratic institutions are 
especially weak, banking systems can be highly unstable, and very susceptible to external 
interference. Sudan has never had a stable economic system based on market forces before, 
and there are widespread corruption in the society as well as the economy, so establishing an 
accountable system will prove to be a challenge (Abulemoi 2011:129). A fundamental issue 
with the Sudanese economy is that it is driven by natural resources and not taxation, which is 
easier to account for. D’Agoôt (2009:122) argues that a powerful kleptocracy has emerged in 
the center of Sudan that is heavily dependent on revenue from oil. This claim is backed up by 
numbers from Global witness (2009:28) that shows corruption and serious discrepancies in 
the oil economy, connected to 26.9 percent of the oil produces in the South between 2005 and 
2009. With such a foundation, economic stability and sustainable growth can prove difficult, 
and the failure to achieve such goals can deteriorate the peace process completely.  
 
4.5 Questions of land ownership and natural resources 
Geopolitics should never be underestimated in international relations and especially 
not in the Sudanese conflict. Land has historically been the most important resource in Sudan. 
The vast country has been exploited for agriculture and herding of cattle, or resources like 
water, oil or minerals. In order to gain power, land ownership has been integral. Politicization 
of land ownership and tenure can be traced back to the colonial administration in 1923 that 
divided the country into diar, or tribal homelands, which still can be seen in modern maps. 
The ties between a tribe and its dar (singular for diar) are strong, and have created special 
power relationships that historically have allowed the more powerful tribes to claim resources 
within this area and thereby marginalize minor tribes. This was very convenient for the 
colonial administration, which only needed to maintain relationship with the tribal chiefs of 
the largest tribes, thus enforcing a hierarchy that favored the powerful within the Sudanese 
society (Ayoub 2006). Through practice over many decades, this hierarchy has lead to a 
society with legislation favoring the strong government. The Unregistered Land Act of 1970 
has strengthened the rights of the state on behalf of the people, allowing people with close ties 
to the government to seize land from rural inhabitants. Such practice became a problem in 
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South Kordofan and the Nuba Mountains in the 1970s, when land was expropriated in order 
to be used for mechanized farming. Many people had to leave their homes, which in turn 
became the main reason why people in those areas joined the SPLM/A forces at that time 
(Pantuliano 2007:1). With regards to the history of unjust land right legislation, this issue 
would be of importance, especially for the SPLM.  
The mediations crystallized quickly into an irreconcilable dichotomy. Representatives 
from the GoS wanted to divide surface land from subterranean resources as two separate 
categories. They were willing to concede on the land issues, giving into SPLMs demands for 
community based rights, contrasting the existing regime. But with that concession, they 
wanted to gain control over subterranean resources and the revenue from this, leaving a 
certain percentage of the revenue from this industry to the GoSS (Abulemoi 2011:130). 
SPLM themselves could not agree to these terms, and did not want to differentiate between 
land and subterranean land, seeing that both should belong to the local communities. In 
addition, the existing laws did not properly protect customary land rights, according to the 
SPLM, so they couldn’t agree to the initial concession by the GoS in the first place. These 
negotiations became too difficult, so the mediators decided to postpone the decision of land 
ownership and rather share the revenue temporary. To sort this out, they created a National 
Land Commission (NLC) and a Southern Sudan Land commission (SSLC). These 
commissions are meant to solve land disputes on communal land areas, based on common 
law. This might be an adequate solution, but the commissions are formally subject to the 
National Constitutional Court, so they might be overruled and thereby limited in effect 
(Abulemoi 2011:131). The second part of the compromise to divert the land issue away from 
the main negotiations was to solve the issue of the oil sector, but individually. It would be 
difficult to construe any kind of real peace agreement without consent the issue of oil. 
 
4.6 Duality in the importance of oil – from conflict to development 
Oil extraction became a focal point of the Sudanese conflict in 1978, when Chevron 
made its first discovery. The SPLM/A started to target oil installations for attacks in order to 
hinder the oil sector in the country to grow. This became a focal strategic aim in the battle 
against the North; to deprive them of extra funding to maintain the war economy. By 1992 
Chevron was forced to withdraw its efforts in the country (Moro 2011:2). South Sudan and 
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the SPLM long perceived Western companies as working together with the regime in 
Khartoum and thereby supporting that side in the conflict (Jooma 2005:11).  
After 1992 oil became less important, until 1999 when the first exports became a fact. 
The importance of oil in the Sudanese economy continued to increase steadily, making it a 
larger part of the conflict dynamic as the industry grew, by 2007, the petroleum sector 
accounts for almost 20 percent of Sudan’s GPD (Appendix D). Oil policy and the oil rich 
regions have gained special attention throughout the negotiations of the CPA. Why IGAD 
accentuated the issue of sharing oil revenue as an important part of the CPA seems obvious 
when looking at the location of oil fields in Sudan. Oil producing areas are scattered along the 
disputed border line, leaving key issues like demarcation contentious (Appendix C). 
Comparing the post-CPA situation to the one after the agreement, it is clear that oil, as with 
other significant sources of revenue is important and should be properly dealt with. As the 
South struggled with almost no revenue after the agreement, the North gained increased 
amount of income from newly discovered oil fields as well as most other commercial business 
ventures. As the oil issue wasn’t a part of the root causes, it still became a part of the central 
dynamic of the conflict.  
The CPA had many ambitious goals, which many was imperative to secure peaceful 
relations between the two parts. With the question of oil, the issue was intricate in itself, the 
stakes involved substantial potential for future revenue and the resource was bound to the 
highly unstable, unresolved border areas. Without solving this issue, little would be possible 
with regards to the rest of the peace process. This is why IGAD separated the oil issue from 
the ownership issue. However, despite many serious obstacles to resolving the issues of oil 
rich areas, oil revenue sharing, oil investment policy and many more connected with this, 
there was one very important aspect of this particular negotiation; oil, a previous source of 
conflict and financial source of war could now be turned around to something positive; a basis 
of revenue to promote development in a war torn country.  
 
4.6.1 Dividing the oil sector 
Chapter III, Section 3 to 6 regards oil resources and how to share revenue that derives 
from this. At the first glance it appears that the negotiators from SPLM wrote this with no 
objections from Khartoum at all, it doesn’t resembles the model that the NCP proposed 
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initially. It is correct to give SPLM credit for this achievement, although the outcome could 
well have been the only feasible solution. When that is said, there are issues related to the oil 
issue that remained unresolved. Especially the oil rich regions on the border and the transport 
of oil out of South Sudan are issues that have been and are going to be contentious to the 
extent of threatening the relative stability between the two parts. Issues of pipeline fees and 
disputed ownership to oil fields became the first major issues during the first year after the 
secession. Problems regarding oil will be discussed later in this chapter.  
In order to establish ground rules for the management and development of the 
petroleum sector, the section starts with guiding principles which will serve as the 
overarching structure for the following sections. Objectively, these principles are very 
progressive and good. They emphasize the importance of sustainability in the sector, when it 
comes to national interest and the public good in general, but also the people that may be 
affected by the production. According to paragraph 3.1.2 the agreement shall ensure 
“Empowerment of the appropriate levels of government to develop and manage in 
consultation with the relevant communities…” (CPA 2005:51). It follows up by establishing 
that persons that enjoy “rights in land” shall receive compensation if they are affected by the 
extraction of subterranean natural resources. For local communities positioned in the oil rich 
regions, this should come as good news; however, that reality does not correspond to written 
words in the agreement is obvious to the regions of Abyei, South Kordofan, the Blue Nile and 
the Nuba mountains. The paradox is also very clear in the agreement, whereas the following 
chapters concern the conflicts in Abyei, Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile. Further on, 
Gadkarim (2010:5) notes another contradiction in the agreement; whereas the CPA stipulates 
a commitment to devolution of power and decentralization of decision making, no local 
communities were invited to actually setting up national policies or the framework for the 
regulation and management of the oil sector. 
The political apparatus for managing the oil sector was constituted in the CPA as the 
National Petroleum Commission (NPC). In accord with the agreement, this commission had 
the mandate to perform most functions relating to the oil sector. From the process of 
formulating public policy and guidelines to monitoring and assess the implementation of these 
policies. It was meant to develop strategies and programs and negotiate and approve oil 
contracts. A lot of power was vested in this one commission, with little external regulatory 
mechanisms. Abulemoi (2011:138) suggest that a reason for this might be the long term 
perspective; both parties can accept that the NPC deals with the oil sector throughout the 
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interim period. For the SPLM, this means that they could postpone new leases in the region 
until after the referendum in order to deal with it on their own afterwards. For the NCP, they 
avoided that the South got their own commission, and they probably anticipated that the 
South would be forced to sign contracts during the interim period in order to gain revenue 
(Abulemoi 2011:139).  
 
4.6.2 Sharing of revenue from existing contracts – dangerous discrepancy 
Since 1974, Sudan has already concluded contracts with many oil companies. The 
details of these contracts have been drawn and negotiated by the GoS. The SPLM/A asked to 
renegotiate the contracts that were applicable to the South, on the grounds that they were 
illegal because the land belonged to the local communities. The GoS responded that 
renegotiations could harm the climate for foreign direct investments (FDI), which would be 
detrimental for both parts. Through the negotiations, the SPLM/A changed their position and 
agreed to leave the existing contracts unchanged, as stipulated in section 4.2 (CPA 2005:53). 
As the existing contracts were deemed valid, extraction from these fields would continue 
during the interim period in addition to any new ones that the NPC would allow for. Earlier in 
this chapter, the increase of the oil sector as a component in the GDP was explained, and this 
meant there was a lot of revenue to share after the CPA. In the Abyei alone, the accumulated 
revenue between 2005 and 2007 were approximately 1.8 billion USD (Gadkarim 2010:2). Oil 
revenues accounted for almost 20 percent of the Sudanese GDP in 2007 (Appendix D).  
The financial situation for both parts was dire; South Sudan released their first official 
figures regarding gross domestic product (GDP) in August 2011, where the National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS) calculated the numbers for 2010 to be 30 billion Sudanese Pounds, which 
is equals 13 billion USD (NBS 2011), which is the same as Gabon, a country with 1.5 million 
inhabitants, compared to South Sudan’s 8 million. Little revenue and almost non-existing 
infrastructure and many social burdens paint the picture of a region with many serious 
difficulties. A medical writer, Emma Ross, described to the Sudan tribune that Southern 
Sudan was one of the poorest and most neglected areas on Earth with “possibly the worst 
health situation in the world” (Ross 2004). The Khartoum regime possesses a more developed 
society with regards to infrastructure and state services, but there are many negative 
indications towards a struggling economy in the North as well. Sansculotte-Greenidge & 
Tsuma (2011:5) point to hyperinflation in the Sudanese dinar, an increasingly active black 
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market, price hikes and massive corruption as indicators that the GoS are struggling to 
maintain their budget. Their 37.8 billion USD foreign debt is the proof of a badly run 
economic policy that has prevailed since the 1980s. On the expense side, the war has cost the 
government more than 1 million USD every day for many years (World Vision 1999:1). 
Economic hardship can affect the peace process severely. One example of this is the 
claims that the government in the North is deliberately inflating the value and amount of gold 
and other precious metals; as the data from Khartoum states that the country produced 36 tons 
of gold in 2009, other sources claim that the real number was more likely four tons of gold. 
The claims suggest that the cause of the false report has to be seen in the light of oil sharing in 
the CPA; while the sharing of oil revenue is stipulated in the agreement with a large quantity 
designated for Southern Sudan, no such agreements are specified for other resources such as 
gold. (Sansculotte-Greenidge & Tsuma 20011:6). If oil revenue is camouflaged as revenue 
from other resources, this would explain the massive discrepancy between oil extraction and 
revenue reported after the CPA. Global Witness (2009:28) compared the numbers from oil 
companies with the one given from the government in Khartoum, and found that the 
governments numbers on oil production were lower than the ones from the companies 
themselves, whereas the worst cases showed a discrepancy of 26 percent, which would 
amount to almost 32 million barrels per year. In addition to this highly suspect numbers, the 
government in Khartoum is adding a three percent management fee as well as pipeline fees, 
which can be up to eight percent. Altogether, this could have been regarded as a breach of the 
agreement by the South and compromised the peace process.  
On top of the financial aspect, the politics of the infrastructure is a potential source of 
conflict; D’Agoôt (2009:124) questions the oil infrastructure in the North to be intentionally 
managed so that after the South secedes, the oil sector would still be dominated by the North. 
Refineries, pipelines, export terminals, airports, roads, etc. are all diverting the oil away from 
the Southern areas and through the North.  D’Agoôt compares the situation to Russia and 
Ukraine, where the gas pipes are used as leverage in political disputes. The concern is two-
fold; on the one side the North can block access to refineries and all possibilities of export as 
a mean to political gain, which would leave the South in a difficult position; on the other side 
the South can try to avoid this situation by investing in their own infrastructure, but they 
would have to use large amounts of their first earned revenue on that project instead of 
focusing on development issues. Both situations will cause loss in revenue for both parts, 
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which could work as an incentive to maintain status quo in both ends, but that is also 
depending on stability in the North/South-relations. 
All in all, the sharing of the petroleum sector is something that will bind North- and 
South Sudan together for many years. There are many risks involved throughout this process, 
many which could bring about another period of violence. The notion of oil as a curse is well 
established throughout history, for many reasons; the tax aspect, which means that revenue 
comes from one large channel which shadows the tax revenue and in the end creates a 
distance between the governing elite and the people; then the mono-export aspect, which 
means that since one sector is representing all of the export thus other export sectors 
disappear because of high inflation; but for North- and South Sudan, the aspect of sharing the 
revenue properly will prove to be integral. In addition to all these pitfalls and potential 
disputes, both parts need to make their oil sectors attractive for foreign investment; 
Shankleman (2011:15) emphasize that oil exploration companies are looking towards low 
risk-high return areas first. This means that the governments of Sudan need to prove that it is 
rational for these companies to invest in these areas, that they will not be in the middle of a 
war zone, or that they will face international sanctions after going in.  
According to the CPA, paragraph 3.1.3, the two parts are to “Give due attention to 
enabling policy environment for the flow of foreign direct investment by reducing risks 
associated with uncertainties regarding the outcome of the referendum…” (CPA 2005:51). In 
principle, this would be assuring for foreign investors, looking at the situation in the country. 
However, the situation on the ground is far from that straight forward. During the 
negotiations, the three adjacent areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile, which 
all are located at the most oil rich border areas between North- and South Sudan needed to be 
dealt with separately. These highly disputed border areas were postponed, in the sense that 
Abyei was going to have a separate referendum at the end of the interim period and that the 
Southern Kordofan/Blue Nile states and the Nuba Mountains was going to reconstitute a 
previous Southern Kordofan province (Abulemoi 2011:149). In the post-CPA period, these 
areas are still the most contentious and violence ridden areas, most prone to compromise the 
ceasefire. The contradiction between the FDI friendly formulations in the CPA and the reality 
on the ground remains a dangerous paradox.  
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4.7 The Abyei conflict 
 Chapter IV of the CPA is dedicated to the area of Abyei alone. The two parts 
regards this area as “a bridge between the north and the south, linking the people of Sudan” 
(CPA 2005:65). According to the agreement, Abyei belongs to nine of the Ngok Dinka 
chiefdoms that were transferred to Kordofan in 1905, while the nomadic people that use the 
land will retain the right to graze cattle and to occupy the territory. As mentioned above, the 
two parts did not agree on the status of Abyei, hence this area was given special 
administrative status, which meant that during the interim period, they would be subject to a 
set of rules laid out in the agreement. They would be citizens of both Western Kordofan in the 
North and Bahr el Ghazal in the South. The administration would be a local Abyei Executive 
Council, elected by the residents. Oil revenue from the region were to be divided by specific 
measures; 50 percent to the GoS, 42 percent to the GoSS, two percent to the Bahr el Ghazal 
region, two percent to the Western Kordofan region, two percent to the Ngok Dinka 
chiefdoms and two percent to the nomadic Misseriya people of the region (CPA 2005:67). 
This constellation would be valid until the end of the interim period, when the residents of 
Abyei were to have a simultaneous referendum to the Southern Sudan referendum, deciding 
where they would belong, irrespective of the results of the Southern referendum.  
 By January 2011, the referendum in Abyei was not held, although the South Sudan 
referendum did go through as planned. The reason behind this was that the North and the 
South did not manage to agree on who that should be eligible to vote. In the South, the 
position was that only the permanently based Ngok Dinka should be eligible in the vote 
(Garang 2011). The North opposed this view, because the Ngok Dinka people are a sub-group 
of the Dinka ethnicity, which is the largest and most geographically extensive group in 
Southern Sudan. By default, this means that if they would be the only voters, Abyei would 
most likely become a part of South Sudan. The issue at hand is that the Khartoum government 
wants to make the nomadic Misseriya people eligible to vote in Abyei as well; they are 
considered Arab and also allied to the North. Some of the Misseriya people have settled in the 
region permanently and many live in the town of Abyei (HRW 2008:12).  
 The disagreement on this issue is not capricious or random. Douglas H. Johnson, a 
specialist in Sudanese history, suggest that these delays have to be seen in a larger context, 
because the NCP have consistently used various delaying tactics throughout the CPA 
negotiations, and this is what they are doing in Abyei as well (Johnson 2011:4). Such delay 
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tactics can be divided in two: Political and military. At the political level, the method is to 
delay and postpone processes by refusing to cooperate; in December 2009, the Abyei 
Referendum Act was passed by the National Assembly. The purpose of this act was to give 
the Abyei Referendum Commission which was constituted in the CPA Chapter IV, section 8, 
the authority to decide who was eligible to vote in the Abyei referendum (AARA 2009:4). 
However, this commission never became constituted, because the National Assembly, which 
have a majority of the NCP refused to accept the candidates that the SPLM appointed to the 
head of the commission (Johnson 2011:6). The NCP have also acted inconsistently regarding 
Abyei; previously the party’s position was to restrict the definition of the Abyei territory as 
much as possible. They also set a precedent in the Southern Referendum Act where seasonal 
nomads were not given voting rights (SSRA 2010:14), when the disagreement over the same 
issue in Abyei, the NCP took the opposite stance. Johnson (2011:3) also points out the timing 
of the abrupt violence that occurred in Abyei January and February 2011. Attacks took place 
right in the middle of the implementation of an agreement between the Ngok Dinka and the 
Misseriya, which caused a disruption in the process. Especially conspicuous is the method of 
these attacks; it has not been farmers fighting over land, which would be considered usual, the 
firearms was heavy, and the attacks were carried out by uniformed raiders with helicopters 
that evacuated wounded soldiers. Not only did this halt the reconciliation process, but it also 
led to many people fleeing the area (ERSS 2011). Johnson (2011:4) sees this fighting as the 
“most serious sign yet that, despite public pronouncements so enthusiastically hailed by the 
international community, Khartoum is not committed to a full implementation of the final 
stages of the CPA”.  
 
4.7.1 Demarcation of geographic boundaries 
 According to Chapter IV, section 5 in the CPA, the Presidency was to establish an 
Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) that had the mandate to define and demarcate the 
Abyei area. This commission was put together by experts, representatives of the local 
communities and the local administration (CPA 2005:68). Objectively, this appears to be a 
minor issue, which should be easy to get through by getting advice from experts on the area 
and agreeing on following their suggestions as stipulated in the agreement. In retrospect, this 
rather small part of the peace agreement turned out to become one of the most volatile parts 
and the most demanding with regards to the implementation of the CPA in its entirety. As 
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anticipated, the groundwork did not take long, after three months the ABC could deliver its 
decision, where they defined the scope of the Abyei region to amongst other things contain 
two major oil fields (ABCR 2005:21). The independent experts had conducted thorough 
investigations, to discover the validity of the claims made by both the GoS and the SPLM. 
They found could not find any maps of written evidence that the Ngok Dinka chiefdoms had 
the territory around 1905, but they concluded that the GoS claim that the Ngok Dinka all 
resided south of the Bahr El-Arab river was false and was mainly based on a report from a 
British official who mistook the Ragaba ez-Zarga for the Bahr El-Arab (Abulemoi 2011:155). 
When the ABC presented their results, both the Messiriya people and President al-Bashir 
rejected the report on the grounds that the commission had exceeded its mandate, with the 
demand that its significance should be relegated from report to recommendation. The problem 
was that the CPA was clear on the binding element of the ABCs decision, there wasn’t any 
mechanism built in where any part could appeal. Thus, the GoS decided to refuse to accept 
the decision. Short after, both parties began to build up their military around the Abyei 
(Abulemoi 2011:156). As noted earlier, violence broke out, many people were killed and 
thousands of people were forced to flee. With little option left for both sides besides a 
detrimental war which neither seemed interested in, the parties finally agreed to resolve this 
dispute by arbitration.  
 Arbitration was appealing to the two parties for a number of reasons; first the 
decision makers were intended to be impartial and independent; second, the flexibility of the 
process would meet their own requirements and schedule; further on, arbitration is regarded 
as a long-established dispute resolution process that could provide certainty to the parties that 
they both received a fair and proper hearing and a decision founded on legal principles. For 
this purpose, the parties chose the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCoA) in The Hague 
(Miles & Mallett 2010:318). A tribunal was constituted which was required to decide upon 
the issue using applicable law, whereas they initiated by establishing a hierarchy among the 
sources of applicable law; the CPA standing as the first source of law, followed by the Interim 
National Constitution, before the general principles of law would apply. Beforehand, the GoS 
had accused the ABC of making the decision ex aequo et bono, which basically is saying that 
they chose the end result because they saw it to be fair and equitable, and not based on sound 
evidence, this is a practice in arbitration where both parties need to consent to the practice if 
used (Miles and Mallett 2010:321). According to the PCA, they did not regard that they had 
the mandate to perform such practice, but they would base its decision on these principles: a) 
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in line with SPLM, agreeing that the appropriate standard of review was to consider if the 
ABSs decision was reasonable of its mandate; b) a determination that ABCs interpretation of 
its mandate was not unreasonable; and c) it determined that the mandate was not exceeded by 
the procedures (Miles & Mallett 2010:322). Three months of arbitration and processing later, 
the decision was made by the PCA. In essence, the region was reduced in size, and the large 
Heglig oilfield was put outside the borders, this was accepted by both parties and celebrated 
as a victory; UN Special Envoy to Sudan Asraf Qazi stated that “I do believe this has been a 
win-win decision for both sides” (BBC 2009).  
 In essence, two very important questions stood in the way of a successful 
implementation of the CPA in the Abyei region; who are the inhabitants; and where does the 
border line go? After the end of the interim period, only one of these questions was answered.  
Abulemoi (2011:156) claims that one reason why the ABC failed in its original approach was 
that it let the NCP and the SPLM/A represent the local communities, much emphasis was but 
on oil fields, many efforts in the area was postponed, and in the end the lack of civil 
administration in Abyei left a large lack in education, sanitation and health services in the 
area, in addition to making it a very unsecure place to live. 
 
4.8 Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States 
 According to Abulemoi (2011:160), the people of Southern Kordofan in the Nuba 
Mountains and in the state of Blue Nile were not fighting for an independent state, but rather 
accepted to be a part of a new Sudan based on equality, democracy, respect of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. According to the CPA, this looks like a fair assessment; the two 
parties were to carry out a popular consultation in order to carry out the will of the people of 
the two states Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile (CPA 2005:74). On paper, the agreement 
looks to have a positive connotation for these areas; it provides power- and wealth sharing to 
some extent and special security reforms. However, the reality for these states is that they find 
themselves in an intricate situation, which might leave them in a very difficult position in the 
long run.  
 While the future of Sudan was decided, Southern Kordofan should have been an 
important piece in these negotiations. Especially in the Nuba Mountains, many black African 
ethnic groups reside, that claim to have more in common with the South, whereas many also 
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fought alongside SPLA in the wars (Martell 2011). In addition, the Nuba people fought their 
own war, to preserve indigenous cultures, languages and religion. Despite their effort in the 
South as well as their own struggle for autonomy, they did not get to have any representatives 
from their state in the SPLMs lead negotiating team, leaving them an easier disposable piece 
in a negotiation (Flint 2011:8). As a result, the states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile 
never got the opportunity to hold their own referendums, but rather the vague term ‘popular 
consultations’, which was understood as talks that should reveal what the people wanted for 
the future. Even though these talks were an abysmal compromise from the start, it worsened 
when the governor of Southern Kordofan Ahmed Haroun suspended the process. Haroun is at 
the time wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crime charges regarding 
violence in Darfur (Martell 2011). 
 The border line states are so intricately connected with both the North and the 
South, hence the future of these areas will be integral for the peace process in its entirety. That 
is why the situation in especially the Nuba Mountains should be regarded as a high risk area 
for future violent outbursts. A general assumption in this study is that local democracy and 
autonomy can help stabilize in a peace process; in that regard, the Abyei situation may look 
worse because of the current situation, but the end result might be more prosperous with 
regards to the peace agreement. Many people in the Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile 
which all want to be a part of South Sudan will end up in a limbo where they are neglected or 
suppressed by both the North and the South, creating a dangerous element to an already 
unstable peace.  
 
4.9 Security arrangements 
 With the intention of preserving the relative peace between the two sides, the final 
chapter in the CPA is dedicated to Security Arrangements. Chapter VI deals with the future 
structure of the two armed forces at both sides and how the ceasefire shall continue. As 
discussed earlier, the security arrangement after the Addis Ababa Agreement caused many 
problems for the South. In 1972, the agreement constituted a new army consisting of soldiers 
from both sides; this unity army in effect absorbed 6000 of the Anyanya forces, while another 
6000 soldiers was stationed as police, or in prisons or as other civil servants. Senior officers 
were transferred to the North, which left the South in lack of higher ranking officers. (Okumu 
& Ikelegbe 2010:269). This faulty structure was one of the main causes of the success of the 
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SPLA as a rebel movement, and the leadership learned from the mistakes of the Anyanya, 
which can be seen in paragraph 1.b. “…the Parties agree that the two forces, the SAF and the 
SPLA shall remain separate during the Interim Period” (CPA 2005:87). This constellation 
ensured that the South was able to preserve their leverage towards the North and thus making 
the possibility of secession viable still. The new military structure was aimed at creating 
stability between two forces, not by disentangling one of them; this was a great improvement 
from the agreement. In line with this, the two parties agreed to a proportional downsizing of 
the armies on both sides. The ceasefire was agreed to be stipulated under the supervision of 
international experts and IGAD mediators, as well as monitored by international actors like 
the UNMIS (CPA 2005:87).  
 Although the security arrangement stipulated in the CPA should be regarded as a 
better solution than the arrangement from the Addis Ababa Agreement, Khartoum managed to 
push through one demand which seems like a compromise between the last arrangement and 
the will of the SPLM; namely the Joint Integrated Units (JIU). In the agreement, these units 
were to constitute a “nucleus of a post referendum army of Sudan, should the result of the 
referendum confirm unity” (CPA 2005:88). However, this nucleus became a mostly non-
functional group, lacking in equipment and support. According to Rolandsen (2009:14) the 
JIUs has started to become a political arena and thus a security liability in itself. It serves as 
proof that an entire integration of SAF and SPLM would be a failed project, as the lesson was 
learned in 1972. Much of the problem with these units were that they weren’t put together as 
in the agreement, they were basically half SPLA forces put together with other armed forces 
that fought alongside SAF against the South previously, but were now considered illegal as 
independent forces in the South (Verjee 2011:7). In essence, it was a temporary solution for 
Khartoum to deal with former allies which now were unwanted.  
 Three specific incidents indicate serious problem with the chain of command in the 
JIU, and serves as examples of the previous critique. Two of these incidents happened in 
Malakal, a South Sudan city on the north-eastern border to the Sudan. Both of these incidents 
were connected to a former Southern Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) commander Major 
General Tanginya. In both instances, the fighting was internal in the JIU and crystallized itself 
to the previous alliances, between some SAF and some SPLA forces, dividing the town 
accordingly (Verjee 2011:8). The last instance happened in Abyei, and the actions of JIU in 
this instance can really emphasize the core of the problem with a joint army. While fighting 
broke out between non-JIU soldiers in May 2008 in the area of Abyei, the mandate of the JIU 
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would be to break up the clash and protect the Abyei. On the contrary, the Abyei JIU 
disintegrated swiftly and rejoined their former allies on their respective side (Verjee 2011:9).  
 Since the JIU was to be rejoining their previous allies in the case of secession, 
another problem arrived. Since the SPLA forces are loyal to the South, this would not be 
problematic, but for the former SAF units, which mostly are composed of wartime local 
militia and illegal as SAF fighters, a void would emerge which needed to be filled (Sedra 
2011:10). One rather temporary solution has been to continue the JIU model in certain areas; 
since the end of the interim period, a new and enforced JIU was placed in Abyei as a part of 
the Kadugli Agreement (Verjee 2011:11). Rolandsen (2009:16) suggest that a general 
disarmament of the public could be a solution to decrease violence and transfer the monopoly 
of violence to the state actors, which in turn could make it possible to disarm the JIU as well. 
However, this solution seems less feasible, because civilians play a role in the defense of 
South Sudan in case of a future war. 
 
4.10 External factors affecting the peace process 
 As with most other large conflicts, the peace process in Sudan is not isolated from 
the world, there are many actors, stakeholders, international organizations and states that 
interfere. Some convey a message of peace by their interference, some have own agendas, like 
access to oil fields or religious missions, and some get mixed up by the proximity to the 
conflict itself. This section will aim to identify the most important actors that have played a 
part in changing the dynamic of the peace process. 
 
4.10.1 A regional context 
 Although regional and international involvement both are external interference, 
there is a significant difference that is important to emphasize; interdependence. Neighboring 
states are not necessarily interfering by own choice, but because of the close proximity or 
geopolitical necessity. Regional actors are most likely not only interfering, but also being 
affected themselves, or trying not to. The Sudan was the largest country in Africa, and thus 
they have many neighbors. Each of the border states have their own interest at stake which 
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they will act to preserve, following a history in the region of meddling, proxy wars and cross-
border entanglement.  
 
4.10.2 The Arab spring – how would it influence Sudan?  
 The ‘Arab spring’, which was a series of revolts and revolutions that started in 
Tunisia, 18 December 2010, have changed the whole Arab world. Starting with the Jasmine 
Revolution in Tunisia, where the government was overthrown, word quickly spread 
throughout the region and people in other countries took to the streets. It is not the aim of this 
study to speculate in the dynamics of these happenings, but to recognize that they happened. 
In Egypt, the Mubarak regime came to an end after just 18 days of protests (Peterson 2011). 
The relations between Sudan and Egypt go far back, as described in chapter two of this study. 
Egyptian influence has been intricate and long withstanding, especially for the North Sudan, 
which is of utmost strategic importance for Egypt. The position from Cairo when it came to 
the CPA has been an adamant opposition to the South’s desire to secede; in fact they have put 
pressure on al-Bashir to spend more in the South to make unity attractive. Fearing that 
Southern Sudan would become unsustainable in the long run as an independent state which 
might open the door to extremists, Egypt became a key actor in the peace process, promoting 
a peaceful unified solution (ICG 2010:9,11). The question is how the new government will act 
towards the Sudanese peace process, because they cannot ignore it. Not only because of the 
close proximity, but Sudan controls the water that flows through the Nile, the lifeblood of 
Egypt. It is imperative that the new governments in Egypt and South Sudan chose to abide by 
the 1959 Nile Agreement, which deals with the geopolitics of the river (Salman 2011:157). 
 Another regional power that has previously been involved in the Sudan conflict is 
Libya. The policy of Muammar Qaddafi has been to weaken the regime in Khartoum, by 
support the SPLA with finances and military support, as far back as the 1980s. Although, this 
seems like a proxy war approach, whereas the primary goal of Libya is to establish an 
autonomous Darfur region. Qaddafi has conveyed an ambiguous message regarding the 
outcome of the CPA, both for and against secession, but he did claim that Libya would be the 
only Arab country to support South Sudan in independence (ICG 2010:16). In February 2011 
civil unrest exacerbated in Libya, causing a violent clash between the government and a large 
and eclectic group mass of oppositional demonstrators. The Gaddafi regime fell, with the 
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support from UN and NATO, and was taken over by a transitional government lead by 
Mustafa Abdel-Jalil (Cooper & MacFarquhar 2011). 
 It will take time before the consequences of the Arab spring is final; there are still 
many uprisings and unstable situations in many countries. It is without doubt that the region 
has changed; this change will in turn have ripple effects all over the world and in the nearby 
area. The future of both Sudan and South Sudan will be affected by these changes, but it is too 
early to pinpoint exactly what they will be. One indication is that the international community 
has changed their policy after the Arab spring; whereas the US, Europe, China and Russia 
often regarded state sovereignty as internal matters; they have now abandoned dictators like 
Mubarak, Gaddafi and to some extent Assad in Syria (Prendergast 2011:2). This development 
may concern President al-Bashir, which is wanted by the ICC for accusations of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur (ICC 2008). When people demonstrated in 
Khartoum, much like the other Arab spring demonstrations, the regime met the people with 
brutal measures, according to Prendergast (2011:1) also rape of female protestors. For future 
speculations, one could ask if the worst enemy to the regime in Khartoum could be hidden in 
its own population and not in the South. 
 
4.10.3 Uganda and the LRA 
 As a neighbor to South Sudan, Uganda and President Yoweri Museveni has been 
one of the greatest supports during the war. They supported SPLA diplomatically, but also 
through direct military and financial support. The Ugandan army and SPLA formed close 
bonds through this alliance. However, this support was not appreciated in Khartoum, which 
retaliated against Uganda by providing weapons, finances, military intelligence and training 
to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which moves around in Northern Uganda, close to the 
South Sudanese border (ICG 2010:5). Even though the government in Uganda is a close ally 
to South Sudan, the border is still a problematic area; there have been many reports of LRA 
raiding villages over the border (Amos 2011). To maintain two borders of that length and 
intensity is very demanding and almost impossible for a country that many believe doesn’t 
have the capacity to sustain itself.  
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4.10.4 A new regional economic area – Kenya and Ethiopia 
 There are close ties between Kenya and Sudan. The war put an extra burden on 
Kenya, which opened its borders to let almost 100 000 refugees through at its worst. It was 
also the leadership from President Daniel Arap Moi and Lieutenant-General Lazarus 
Sumbeiywo that aided to bring the two parties to the negotiations in 2002 (ICG 2010:1). 
President Salva Kiir spoke of the peace talks and the process as Kenya’s baby and contributed 
a large part of their success to their neighbor when he visited Nairobi after the referendum in 
2011. He spoke of cooperation and development and joint oil ventures (Sudan Tribune 2011). 
These strong economic ties can ultimately prove to a source for a broader economic base in 
the new country, already Kenyans are active in South Sudan’s private sector, working in 
construction, air transport, insurance and with infrastructure (ICG 2010:2).   
 Ethiopia has also strong ties to the Sudan, in 1983, the SPLA established operations 
over their borders and was accommodated by the government there, providing bases, training, 
political direction and weapons. Although Ethiopia largely has supported SPLA throughout 
the conflict, and Khartoum has supported Eritrean and Tigrayan rebels, today the relations are 
good with both parts; the Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin opened a large embassy 
in Khartoum, which follows a prosperous economic cooperation. Ethiopia’s regional stature 
makes them an attractive partner for both sides. In addition, Addis Ababa has opened up for 
much commerce through extensive trade agreements with Juba.  
 
4.10.5 The African Union 
 Incentives from the local surrounding countries can bring about positive 
developments. This thesis will also argue that AUs involvement in assisting with 
implementation of the CPA in addition to mediating post-referendum issues will count as an 
important support when it comes to achieving stability and peace between the two countries. 
The African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), which is led by Thabo 
Mbeki, the former President of South Africa, has had extensive discussions when it comes to 
economic issues like oil and currency; security issues like oversight of borders; political 
issues like disputed areas at the borders; as well as legal issues (African Union 2012:1-4). On 
27 September 2012, the two parties signed many agreements relating to these issues, coming 
closer to the culmination of the two years ongoing negotiations led by AUHIP (ISS 2012). 
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(Hsiao 2012:11) claims that the negotiators from South Sudan have argued that the facilitation 
of the talks has had a bias towards Sudan, and allowed them to maintain extreme positions. 
Despite this criticism, many important issues have been agreed upon, within the groups of 
issues mentioned above. Everyone except for the border areas; these still remains disputed 
issues, and talks are intensified while this thesis is written, after the AU gave an ultimatum to 
the two parties, to reach an agreement on how they are going to proceed with the negotiations 
on the five border areas within two weeks (The Africa Report 2012). An important argument 
in this thesis is that the issue of these border areas is going to be crucial for the development 
of peace between- and within the two countries; if people in these areas are further 
marginalized, it has the potential to create a new conflict with new actors.  
 
4.10.6 International context 
 Throughout this study, several international actors have already been emphasized 
as integral in the peace process. US foreign policy after 11 September 2001; the effort put 
down in the work with the CPA by Italy, Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the US; 
international organizations like the UN, the AU and the EU; NGOs like red cross, MSF, 
Amnesty, Global Witness, International Crisis Group and many more. A variety of 
international actors are involved in this process, some stake holders, others voluntarily 
involved.  
 Without going into detail on each of the actors, it is possible to identify some key 
trends. At the continental level, a tremendous difference between 1972 and 2005 was that 
during the 1990s, the Organization of African Unity changed into the African Union; with this 
change followed a change in attitude towards state sovereignty and intervention. ‘Non-
interference’ and ‘sovereign equality of states’ were important principles reflected in the 
charter of OAU. This had two key implications; first of all, this kept the organization from 
being able to interfere with any matters that could be considered as internal affairs. Even the 
most horrible violations of human rights within states were off jurisdiction for OAU. The 
second implication of the non-interference policy was the acceptance for a culture of impunity 
in some countries on the continent. In effect, this lead to situations where OAU became 
powerless observers to several atrocities committed in or by member states (Gomes 
2008:117). The African community undertook significant changes during the 1990s and 
towards the millennium. A new set of leaders wanted to demonstrate political will and ability 
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to resolve conflicts in more peaceful manners than before. By the start of July 2002, the new 
framework for such political will was constituted in the new organization, The African Union. 
The new peace and security regime was mandated fundamentally different from the previous 
organization. Within this mandate, there was articulated a will for a common defence policy 
and combat of international terrorism (Powell 2005:10). The former principle of state 
sovereignty was now discarded, as the new principle stated: “the right of the Union to 
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision by the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (Gomes 2008: 
124).  
 This change was spurred by a change in norms in the international community; 
more international intervention was accepted, after human atrocities in Rwanda and Sbrenica 
that the international community and state leaders could not accept any longer. Sudan has 
been in the spotlight regarding atrocities committed in Darfur, the civil war, the accusation of 
al-Bashir to the ICC and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Two UN peace keeping forces 
are stationed here, both in Darfur (UNAMID) and in South Sudan (UNMISS) and much 
diplomatic pressure are focused, from both super powers like the US, or neighbouring states. 
In essence, much money, effort and prestige are put into the peace process, but this will not 
last for eternity. At one point, the focus will disappear, and that is when we know if the peace 
was sustainable. 
 International pressure and intervention can still play an integral role in keeping the 
level of conflict low and to encourage trade and development with the two countries. 
However, reaching consensus on how to resolve issues can lead to slow progress on this area. 
One example is the indictment of Omar al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
and how the AU is divided on making an actual arrest. Although the AU stance on this issue 
officially is that shall not cooperate with the ICC in arresting President al-Bashir, some 
member states like South Africa and Botswana have warned that they will make an arrest if he 
enter their state borders (Sudan tribune 2010). In addition to this, Malawi stated that it 
wouldn’t host an AU summit because President al-Bashir was invited (Gondwe & Sterling 
2012). This highlights how the intricacy of international politics in itself contributes to 
slowing down or hindering effective resolutions. 
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4.11 Conclusion 
  This study has previously argued that the conflict between North- and South Sudan 
need to be seen in its entire context, even after the secession of South Sudan. Secession 
should be regarded as a fragment of a process of peace, which might prove to be positive, but 
also carries the potential of failure and regression. The founder of the CPA, John Garang 
knew this and fought for a unified Sudan himself. But no matter how one look at it, the CPA 
stands for a grand progression in the peace process, especially for South Sudan. A great 
amount of people have been born into the war and never experienced peace; they have now 
achieved this objective, but they might not be prepared for the immense project of building a 
new state from scratch. Before, Southern Sudan needed soldiers, now South Sudan need 
teachers, carpenters, plumbers, farmers and entrepreneurs. The obstacles seem immense; just 
achieving adequate development with the goal of reaching basic standard of living for the 
population is going to be a challenge for the state that has been deemed as pre-failed. An even 
greater challenge is to detach the South from the North. Even with a formal division of states, 
the area is so complex and interconnected both socially and economically. This chapter has 
assessed both improvements from the previous attempt for peace, but more importantly the 
many issues that connect the North and the South so intricately that the conflict seems far 
from over, despite the secession. 
 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement has addressed the sources of the conflict, in 
a much more thorough manner than the Addis Ababa Agreement, however, the sources of 
conflict that is most contentious have not been solved. Despite the fact that a new 
institutionalized framework was stipulated that would give more autonomy to the south, the 
reality was a reverse effect; more power got centralized around Khartoum (ICG 2011b:i). This 
is a core source of conflict that failed to be resolved, despite a detailed framework to deal with 
it. Sharing of wealth is a similar issue; this is of utmost importance for South Sudan, in order 
to develop new state institutions and an adequate security regime. However this process has 
also been controlled massively from the North, in addition to be hampered by widespread 
corruption (Abulemoi 2011:129). A third source of conflict that has emerged after the failure 
of the Addis Ababa Agreement is the issue of oil and sharing revenues from production. On 
the paper, this issue has been dealt with, but in reality there are many unresolved issues 
connected with this; meddling with revenue numbers from the North; unresolved land issues 
in the oil rich regions; but also the more important issue of geopolitics – since the North 
control the production sector, from the refineries, pipelines, export terminals, roads, etc. the 
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South will still be closely linked to the regime in Khartoum in the foreseeable future. A 
hierarchy where the central government in the North dominates the entire region in the South 
still prevails.   
 A specific emphasis should be put on Abyei and the other border areas in this 
regard; while remaining unresolved and contentious, they stand as a monument of the dangers 
that still prevails between the two parts. With the secession, these areas are left as even 
smaller minorities and the definite losers in the post-CPA era. With the worst case scenarios 
that were described in chapter three, these areas are arguably the most significant sources for 
a potential violent conflict.  
 Hopefully, the regional and international influence to the Sudanese states will prove 
to be stabilizing and positive. Some elements are potentially destabilizing, like the presence of 
the LRA within South Sudan. However, a seemingly stable region could provide prospects of 
future trade and economic growth.  
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5. Conclusion 
Based on the findings in this study, this final chapter will draw conclusions in order to 
answer the initial two main research questions. By reflecting on the results of this study this 
will consequently raise new questions that may serve as recommendation for future studies. 
The aim of this thesis has been to provide a critical analysis of the peace process with the 
secession of South Sudan being the focal point of attention, and by doing this, contributing to 
a new perspective on secession as a means of liberation from oppression. 
1. To what extent does secession change the power sharing relation between North 
Sudan and South Sudan? 
 
In order to understand the change in power sharing relations, this thesis has provided a 
historical background with the emphasis on root causes and other sources, in order to show 
how the Sudanese society developed and what the causes of today’s conflicts stem from. The 
regime in Khartoum has shown through many years that they want to impose the Arab culture 
and religion on the entire country and all its citizens (Sharkey 2008:21). Only through violent 
opposition did the various groups in Sudan resist this process of Arabization. In turn, this 
created a divided society with informal power relations between the central government and 
the rebel groups.  
By using a holistic approach to theory and the peace process, the aim was to show that 
secession is not a shortcut to solving sources of conflict and that the power relations between 
North and South Sudan will prevail despite the status as a new state that the South achieved.  
The theoretical discussion over secession suggests that there are no consensus on the 
morality and legitimacy of secession. Whereas some regards secession as unproblematic as 
long as the new state is able to perform the basic functions that is demanded of it, others like 
Harry Beran (Pavković & Radan 2007:202) argues that it is not up to a minority to decide 
such issues. The divergence amongst scholars is well reflected in international law as well; on 
the one hand the principle of sovereignty is regarded highly, whereas in terms of secession 
this principle conflicts with the principle of self-determination of people that stipulates that 
everyone has the right to his or hers own nation-state.  
One finding this study has shown is that secession will create new dynamics of power 
sharing within the respective states. As Collier and Hoeffler (2002:26) argues, secession 
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creates even more imbalance in ethnic and religious fractioned states, as shown in the 
example of Yugoslavia after Slovenia and Croatia seceded; this caused the Serb ethnicity and 
culture to become significantly more dominant. This example is relatable to the areas of 
Darfur, Southern Kordofan, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile state. All these areas 
contain large groups of non-Arab opposition groups that became further marginalized after 
South Sudan seceded.  
Another finding is that the secession created a rise in internal violence in South Sudan 
(Rolandsen 2010:1). A growing worry throughout the country is that the government will not 
be able to create security for its citizens. Many armed groups, a large army of soldiers without 
civil training or education and an increased threat on the borders of North Sudan but also 
Northern Uganda where the LRA continues to raid villages is indications of a faulty security 
regime with many challenges. Any internal conflict or destabilizing factor in South Sudan will 
strengthen the relative power to the North.  
Many issues can prove that both states will continue to be intricately linked together 
despite the secession. Through the thorough assessment of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, these issues were revealed and discussed.  
2a. Did the Comprehensive Peace Agreement address the sources of conflict? 
2b. What sources of conflict remain unresolved after the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement 
 
The CPA marks a monumental improvement in the peace process. Compared to the 
Addis Ababa Agreement, it was thorough, it dealt with a broader set of issues and the process 
was given more time. By discussing the agreement chapter by chapter, this study has 
identified a range of important sources of conflict that was addressed. However, the sources 
of conflict that are most contentious have not been solved. It is evident that much of the 
formulations in the agreement were not attempted to uphold. US Special Envoy to the Sudan, 
Senator Danforth described a culture of making agreements but not implementing them: “The 
history of Sudan is littered with dozens of proposals and agreements to end the fighting. 
These agreements all have one thing in common: none was implemented, and none brought 
Sudan closer to peace” (Danforth 2002:4). The concern that the implementation will fail is 
amplified by the fact that many of the important issues like demarcation and sharing of wealth 
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never was mediated. Post-secession violence in the border areas can be seen in correlation 
with this negligence, especially the violent clashes around the Heglig oil field that both parties 
claimed. 
Chapter II of the CPA addresses the issue of institution and power-sharing. The 
purpose was to reflect the real power relations in Sudan, provide a feasible power sharing 
between the North and the South and to spread participation throughout the country. 
However, the implementation of these policies were abysmal; ICG (2011b:i) reported that the 
reality was a reverse effect of power sharing and democracy, more power got centralized 
around Khartoum. Chapter III of the CPA addresses the principles of wealth sharing in Sudan. 
This was an important part for South Sudan, as the new distribution of revenue was 
supposedly aimed to develop new state institutions and an adequate security regime. But 
instead of providing these funds appropriately, the North has been accused of altering their 
official numbers in order to hide oil revenue amongst others (Global Witness 2009:28). 
The politics of oil has become an important source of the Sudanese conflict. In 
addition to the financial aspect, the oil production sector is a good example of how the South 
is continually linked to the North, in this instance because of proximity and geography. The 
infrastructure regarding oil production is designed to favor the North; refineries, pipelines, 
export terminals, airports, roads and such are all diverting oil away from the southern areas 
towards the North. D’Agoôt (2009:124) argues that this infrastructural issue can be highly 
politicized, with the comparison of Russia and Ukraine, where the gas pipes are used as 
leverage in political disputes.  
All in all, there are a lot of unresolved issues that prevails after the CPA interim period 
was over. Many indications point to a more complex and challenging situation in the near 
future. The regrouping of a new opposition in the northern regime can be seen in direct 
correlation with the secession, after many groups were either neglected in the peace process or 
ended on the wrong side of the border. This process created new minorities and new 
problems, possibly with the greatest potential of conflict. After the secession, the further 
marginalization of these groups has the potential of bringing about violent conflict. With 
Rwanda and Sbrenica in mind, the final recommendation for further study has to focus on the 
areas of Darfur, Abyei, Southern Kordofan, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile state. 
These areas host armed militia which the CPA failed to provide any security for, leaving them 
abandoned from their former allies and weaker in relation to the government. A new 
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opposition party, SPLM-North emerged in the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states after 
the secession, consisting of soldiers from the SPLA together with further marginalized groups 
in the north. For these people, the secession created less security, more vulnerability and more 
resentment.  
 The end of the first civil war pushed many southerners to the borderlands; 
training to fight back, this is how the SPLM/A first were founded. In order to avoid further 
conflict in this area, marginalized groups need security and development. As this has not been 
provided for so many groups both in the North and South, there are few indications that this 
area has progressed significantly since the end of the first civil war when it comes to reaching 
peace beyond the secession. 
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